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FRACTURED MEMBERSHIP: DECONSTRUCTING
TERRITORIALITY TO SECURE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
FOR THE UNDOCUMENTED WORKER
D. CAROLINA N(JREZ*
Relied upon but unwelcome, among us but uninvited, undocumented
workers in the United States-now numbering over 8 million-labor on the
border of inclusion and exclusion, between a status-based conception of
membership and a territorial approach to membership. Although mere
presence in the U.S. secures undocumented workers many of the same labor
protections afforded to authorized workers, undocumented status often
forecloses certain remedies otherwise available for employer breaches of
those protections. Many commentators have criticized this effective statusbased denial of rights to undocumented workers as inimical to the goals
underlying labor and immigration law. While this Article echoes some of
those sentiments, its purpose is broader.
This Article bases its critique of the slow encroachment of a statusbased conception of membership into the employment sphere on its failure
to recognize fundamental indicators of membership, including an
individual's ties to the surrounding community, that have historically shaped
notions of membership. However, this Article does not advocate the use of
the historically dominant territorial model, which distributes rights based on
mere territorial presence. It suggests that territoriality, applied in an
increasingly globalized world in which relationships and obligations are not
dictated by physical borders, can no longer adequately answer questions of
membership. Rather, this Article offers a more principled, nuanced
approach-one that arguably is already emerging outside the employment
context-derived from territoriality's underlying rationales but stripped of
that approach's fixation on geography, to secure the rights of undocumented
workers.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States workforce includes over 8 million
undocumented immigrants.' They work in the shadows to evade
deportation, and they accept jobs and working conditions that their
documented counterparts will not.' As invisible as their day-to-day
JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW HIsPANIc CENTER, A PORTRAIT
1.
OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS INTHE UNITED STATES 12 (2009).
2.
Because of understandable underreporting, there are few statistics to
document the grim working conditions experienced by immigrants, especially
undocumented immigrants. The few that exist paint a bleak picture. For example, in
2000, of the 111 people who died on the job in New York City, 74 were immigrant
workers. Thomas Maier, Surge in Imnirant Worker Deaths, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29,
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work may be, undocumented workers are an integral, though
unsanctioned, part of the U.S. economy. They build our houses, tend
our crops, and slaughter our livestock.' They help satiate the American
craving for affordable abundance. At the same time, unauthorized
immigrants are not supposed to be here, and their mere presence
undermines our understanding of community and membership. Relied
upon but unwelcome, among us but uninvited, undocumented workers
labor on the border of inclusion and exclusion and are the subjects of a
series of historically reemerging questions: When and how much should
immigration status matter? Does being here count for anything? Who
belongs? Who is a member?
Over the course of U.S. history, the law has developed some
answers to these questions. In many contexts outside the specific realm
of immigration law, undocumented immigrants have enjoyed virtually
all of the same rights and privileges-and therefore membership-as
their documented counterparts. For example, all individuals present in
the United States, regardless of immigration status, share the right to
enter into contracts, the right to marry, and the right to equal protection
under the law. In these contexts, being here-mere presence within the
U.S.-confers some level of membership in our society. In other
contexts, undocumented immigrants are wholly excluded from
membership rights by their lack of authorized status. Our current
understanding of the right to vote, for example, fits into this scheme:
we generally reserve voting for citizens and exclude all others,
including undocumented immigrants." Likewise, we exclude
2001, at A14. Immigrant dishwashers in Long Island earned an average of $2.50 an
hour and worked over 75 hours a week in 1999. JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN
SWEATSHOPs: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 2 (2005).
Undocumented workers make up 5.4 percent of the U.S. workforce but
3.
represent 19 percent of the animal slaughter and processing industry and 28 percent of
the landscaping services industry. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 1, at 32. See generally
GORDON, supra note 2 (discussing working conditions experienced by today's
immigrants in the "new sweatshops"); see also JEFFERY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC

CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION
INTHE U.S. 11 (2006) ("The share of unauthorized employed in agricultural occupations
(4%) and construction and extractive occupations (19%) was about three times the share
of native workers in these types of jobs.").
Although modem commentators and historians dispute the assumption that
4.
voting was limited to citizens in American colonial and early U.S. history, they agree
that aliens were, with minor exceptions, excluded from the voting franchise by the early
decades of the nineteenth century. See GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTrrUION: IMMIGRANTS,

BORDERS,

AND FUNDAMENTAL

LAw

63-71

(1996)

(describing the voting franchise's increasingly more exclusionary treatment of aliens in
the United States); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the
Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1096 (1977) (cataloging the increasing effort
of state voting laws to exclude aliens).
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undocumented immigrants from many federal welfare benefits.' These
opposing examples highlight the tension between valuing formal
membership in our society, represented by authorized status, and
recognizing de facto membership through presence within the country's
geographic borders. These two approaches to membership-what Linda
Bosniak and others have called the territorial and status-based
approaches-have dominated the distribution of rights and benefits to
aliens in the U.S.'
In the employment context, however, the undocumented immigrant
finds herself in an anomalous situation. On one hand, we recognize
undocumented immigrants' de facto membership in the U.S. workforce
and their participation in our economy by affording them protection
under federal and most state employment law schemes. By virtue of
their territorial presence, undocumented workers have the statutorily
secured right to participate in labor unions,' the right to nondiscriminatory treatment in the workplace,' and the right to
compensation for work-related injury through workers' compensation
programs or tort claims.' However, we denounce undocumented
The 1996 Welfare Act limits the distribution of public federal benefits,
5.
including welfare, health, and unemployment benefits, to "qualified aliens," which
excludes undocumented immigrants. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2006)
("Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... an alien who is not a qualified alien
... is not eligible for any Federal public benefit."); 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (2006) (defining
"qualified aliens"). Some exceptions include emergency medical assistance and noncash emergency disaster relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2006). Even
authorized permanent residents are barred from Federal means-tested public benefits for
five years after admission into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2006).
6.
See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Tenitoriality and the
Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389 (2007) [hereinafter Bosniak,

Being Here ].
7.
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984) (upholding the
NLRB's ruling that undocumented immigrants are protected under the NLRA); Agri
Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that a company
cannot refuse to bargain with employees seeking to unionize because the employees are
undocumented workers).
Rivera v. NBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
8.
that NIBCO cannot use the discovery process to seek documents regarding Rivera's
immigration status because it would chill Title VII claims by undocumented workers);
Iweala v. Operational Techs. Servs., 634 F. Supp. 2d 73, 80 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding
that Title VII protections apply to undocumented workers). Contra Egbuna v. TimeLife Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 187-88 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that Title VII
protections are not available if the employee was not authorized for employment).
9.
Anne Marie O'Donovan, Immigrant Workers and Workers' Compensation
After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 299, 300 (2006) ("In the workers' compensation context, for example, state
courts and agencies have overwhelmingly upheld the rights of undocumented
immigrants to receive benefits. . . ."); see also Katrina C. Gonzales, Note,
Undocumented Imnigrantsand Workers' Compensation:Rejecting Federal Preemption
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workers' unauthorized presence within our borders by excluding them
from many of the remedies available for employers' violations of those
very rights. An undocumented worker in Texas, for example, may be
nominally protected under the state's employment discrimination law,
but unable to recover any lost wages for his employer's blatantly
discriminatory termination of his employment."o Likewise, an
undocumented worker that has been fired for filing a lawsuit to recover
unpaid wages may be compensated for work already performed, but has
no access to the Fair Labor Standard Act's provision of back paycompensation for work that would have been performed if the employee
had not been illegally fired." In effect, this means there is no
compensatory remedy for the retaliatory discharge itself.
Thus, when it comes to enforcing their right to labor protections,
undocumented immigrants find that status often displaces territorial
presence as the ultimate determinant of membership. Their membership
is fractured by the collision of two membership models: undocumented
immigrants' territorial presence guarantees nominal membership, but
their status may preclude enjoyment of full membership rights. In large
part, this fractured membership scheme derives from the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,12 where
the Court reaffirmed the inclusion of undocumented immigrants as
protected employees under the National Labor Relations Act but denied
their access to the remedy of back pay."
Many commentators have criticized Hoffman's effective denial of
rights guaranteed by the NLRA and its broader effect on labor and
employment law."' They decry the Court's dissonant treatment of
of the California Workers' Compensation Act, 41 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 2001, 2004-05
(2008) (noting that there is considerable variance from state to state regarding treatment
of undocumented employees' workers' compensation claims, but California does offer
protections to undocumented workers).
10.
See Escobar v. Sparan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex.
2003) (concluding that claimant "is not entitled to back pay on his claims under Title
VII, such a remedy being foreclosed by the fact that he was an undocumented worker at
the time he was employed by Spartan"). See also Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d
471, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding that economic and non-economic
damages are not available to undocumented immigrant under New Jersey antidiscrimination law where employee was not allowed to return after parental leave).
See Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., No. 02-C-495, 2003 WL 21995190, at
11.
*2, 6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2003).
535 U.S. 137 (2002).
12.
Id. at 151-52.
13.
14.
See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery: Imnhgrant
Workers and the Fifth Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 27, 28-29 (2008) (arguing
that HoFman places undocumented immigrants in the "shadow of the American Legal
System"); Nhan T. Vu & Jeff Schwartz, Workplace Rights and Illegal Imrmigdon:
How Implied Repeal Analysis Cuts Through the Haze of Hoffman Plastic, its

822

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

undocumented workers as inimical to the goals underlying labor and
immigration law." Although I generally agree with and briefly echo
some of those sentiments here, my goal in this Article is broader. Here,
I base my critique of undocumented workers' effective status-based
exclusion from workplace protections on such a scheme's failure to
recognize fundamental indicators of membership, including an
individual's ties to the surrounding community, as well as concerns
over the preservation of the community's character that have shaped
and continue to shape our distribution of rights and benefits in contexts
outside of the labor and employment sphere.
Rather than advocate for a return to strict territoriality as a
normative model for the distribution of employment rights and benefits,
however, I suggest the application of a new approach-one derived
from territoriality's underlying rationales but stripped of its ties to
geography-that I see emerging outside the employment context. I
argue that although territoriality's demise in the employment sphere
superficially resembles territoriality's decline outside of the
employment sphere, the two trajectories are not parallel.
Ultimately, I show that in the employment sphere, territoriality is
giving way to a more formalistic approach-a status-based modelwhile territoriality, as it applies more generally, has undergone a
transformation toward a more principled, more nuanced, post-territorial
approach that takes into account an individual's community ties, the
surrounding community's obligations to individuals subject to its laws,
and the importance of preserving the surrounding community's
character. Echoing Michael Walzer's foundational argument that
membership should be analyzed with reference to the rights being
distributed and should be allocated according to mechanisms that
Predecessorsand its Progeny, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1-2 (2008) (arguing
the Court reached the wrong conclusion in Holfman); David Weissbrodt, Remedies for
Undocumented Noncitizens in the Worlplace: Using InternationalLaw to Narrow the
Holdings of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1424,
1424 (2008) (noting severe criticism of Hoffman by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the International Labor Organization Freedom of Association
Committee).
See, e.g., Sarah Cleveland et al., Inter-American Court of Human Rights
15.
Amicus Curie Brief The United States Violates InternationalLaw When Labor Law
Remedies are RestrictedBased on Workers' Mgrant Status, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc.
JusT. 795, 802 (2003) (arguing that employers are incentivized to hire undocumented
workers because the employers suffer no significant penalty for violating the law);
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 14, at 34-35 (noting that critics have "charged that
[Hoffman] encouraged employers to hire unauthorized immigrants"); Vu & Schwartz,
supra note 14, at 27-28 (arguing that awarding back pay to undocumented immigrants
would further employment law goals, as well as immigration law goals, such that
application of the NLRA's back pay provision as well as IRCA's prohibition on the
hiring of undocumented workers are not mutually exclusive).
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recognize and reward fundamental indicators of membership in that
particular sphere of membership,"' I argue that labor and employment
rights should not be afforded to undocumented workers because of
mere territorial presence or status. Rather, I argue that the postterritorial model more adequately distributes rights according to
concerns relevant to the sphere of employment, where membership
cannot be adequately measured by mere territorial presence or
immigration status.
To reach my conclusions, I begin my analysis in Part I with a
description of territoriality and a brief discussion of its foundations,
including Michael Walzer's concept of complex equality. I compare
territoriality to the status-based model and examine territoriality's
rationales and theoretical underpinnings. In analyzing territoriality's
rationales, I expose some of its weaknesses and conclude that
territoriality, if applied strictly in a modern setting-one in which
personal relationships and obligations are not exclusively determined by
geographic boundaries-does not distribute membership rights in a way
that is consistent with its underlying rationales.
In Part II, I trace the trajectory of territoriality's past and current
influence in U.S. law outside the labor and employment context,
examining territoriality's inclusionary side-its automatic bestowal of
membership on everyone within U.S. boundaries-as well as its
exclusionary side-its automatic denial of membership to those outside
of the boundaries. I focus on courts' rationales for applying
territoriality and, later, as territoriality's influence has waned, their
reasons for abandoning territoriality. I suggest that a new, postterritorial conception of membership, distilled from the very rationales
that once shaped strict territoriality, is displacing strict territoriality
outside of the employment context.
Part IHl catalogues territoriality's waning role in the distribution of
employment rights and benefits and criticizes the status-based model's
encroachment into the employment sphere. I propose that the postterritorial model that appears to be developing in the non-employment
context be applied in the employment context as well to ensure that all
employees, regardless of immigration status, have access to the same
remedies for violations of employment law.
Finally, I offer my conclusions and some questions for the future.

AND

See MICHAEL WALZER,
16.
EQUALITY 3-30 (1983).

SPHERES OF JUSTICE:

A

DEFENSE OF PLURALISM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
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I. THE CONCEPT OF MEMBERSHIP
The distribution of rights, regardless of type, boils down to a
single question: who belongs? This question follows naturally from the
assumption, one that I will not challenge here, that members-those
who belong-deserve a certain type of treatment, and those who are not
members deserve another." After all, distinguishing between members
and non-members would become meaningless if there were no reward
for membership.'" In that sense, the distribution of membership rights is
also an exclusionary process: it is as much about determining who does
not belong as it is about determining who does belong.
We thus make rules to govern our selection of members. In this
Part, I focus on those rules-on the way states decide who is and who is
not a member-and on their fitness for their assigned task of separating
members from nonmembers. I begin with a description and comparison
of the territorial and status-based models, which have significantly
influenced alienage and immigration law over the course of U.S.
history. I then briefly discuss Michael Walzer's theory of complex
equality, which posits that goods, including rights, benefits, and
privileges, should be distributed according to criteria that are
intrinsically related to the good being distributed." Finally, I argue that
territoriality no longer distributes rights in a way that relates to the
goods being distributed. This sets the stage for Part II, in which I trace
territoriality's trajectory outside of the employment sphere to track its
waning role in U.S. law and propose that a newer, post-territorial
model is emerging to account for the problems inherent in territoriality
as applied today.

17.
Cf Ayelet Shachar, The ShifUng Border of Im'mgradon Regulation, 3
J. C.R. & C.L. 165, 166-67, 189-90 (2007) (discussing immigration control as
governing membership in American society). See generally RAINER BAUBOCK,
STAN.

TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP AND RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

(1994).
18.
See, e.g., DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND
THE DECLINE OF CmZENSHIP (1996) (forecasting a significant devaluation of citizenship
due to an increase in transnational migration that, in turn, is causing a the sovereign
state to shift "from an entity that embodies the people's will (national selfdetermination) to an entity that advances transnational rights"); WALZER, supranote 16,
at 64 ("Membership is important because of what the members of a political community
owe to one another and to no one else, or to no one else in the same degree."); Peter
Shuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizensp, 12 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 12 (1997)
(discussing the resurgence of citizenship as a valuable status due to Congress's
withdrawals of certain rights and benefits, including welfare benefits, from
noncitizens).
19.

WALZER, supranote 16, at 17-20.
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A. Competing Membership Models
In the United States, two competing approaches to membership
have historically coexisted.20 The status-based approach values formal,
legal admission to the U.S.,21 while territoriality values de facto
membership as evidenced by physical presence within the country's
borders.2 2 For citizens and authorized immigrants, the model used to
distribute rights is inconsequential-whether an individual enjoys rights
because of her territorial presence or because of her state-sanctioned
status is largely a theoretical question without practical impact. For
unauthorized immigrants, however, the model used means the
difference between inclusion and exclusion, rights and no rights.
The status-based and territorial models each provide a sorting
mechanism-a rule-for dividing members from nonmembers. Broadly
speaking, territoriality distributes membership rights and benefits
according to geographic boundaries.23 Individuals on the "in" side of
the boundary are members, and those on the "out" side are
nonmembers. The territorial conception of membership is thus a binary
one: individuals are either members, who enjoy the full suite of
membership rights available, or nonmembers, who enjoy none. 24
In contrast, the status-based model distributes membership rights
based on an individual's legal status, with increasing membership rights
afforded as an individual ascends the membership "ladder." 2 ' Unlike
20,
See Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 6, at 389-92.
21.
See id.
22.
See id. This categorization of the models largely follows Linda Bosniak's
terminology in Being Here, supra note 6, at 390-92. However, these models, although
under different names and slightly different variations, have been discussed elsewhere.
See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 4, at 6-8 (dividing approaches to the distribution of
constitutional rights into membership approaches, mutuality approaches, universality,
and global due process); see also Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The
Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L.
REv. 955, 1031 [hereinafter Bosniak, Exclusion]; Linda S. Bosniak, Membership,
Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047, 1101-10
(1994) [hereinafter Bosniak, Membershp] (referring to the territorial and status-based
models as "separation" and "convergence" to highlight territoriality's separation of
border control and rights distribution as well as the status-based model's collapse of
those questions into a single question about status).
23.
See NEUMAN, supra note 4, at 7 (describing broad categories of models
for the distribution of constitutional rights, including territoriality, in which "the
Constitution constrains the United States government only when it acts within the
borders of the United States"); Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 6, at 390; Laura Oren,
Comment, The Legal Status of Undocumented Aliens: In Search of a Consistent
Theory, 16 Hous. L. REv. 667, 669 (1979) (discussing and comparing the territorial
and status-based approaches to undocumented immigrants).
Bosniak, Being Here, supranote 6, at 390-91.
24.
25.
Id.
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the territorial model, a status-based model presupposes multiple levels
of membership and a broad spectrum of membership packages. In the
United States, for example, an individual may be, among many
alternatives, an undocumented immigrant, a visitor for pleasure, a
temporary worker, a permanent legal resident, or a citizen.26 Under the
status-based model, each status would correspond to a set of
membership rights and benefits, with citizenship corresponding to the
full suite of membership rights available."
Although the status-based model is appealing in its recognition of
various levels of membership, it is based entirely on the nation-state's
unilateral decision to designate someone a member. State consent is a
fundamental prerequisite to membership under the status-based model.
Territoriality depends not upon the state's consent, but upon the
individual's actions-her choice to remain within the boundaries of the
state. It is this immigrant-focused inclusiveness that has made
territoriality a favorite among commentators.28
However, while broad inclusiveness is territoriality's most
identifiable characteristic, that inclusiveness extends only to the state's
border, at which point territoriality morphs into a rule of exclusion."
Because the border marks the dividing line between members and
nonmembers, the border is the site of the nation-state's control over
membership."o Thus, territoriality does not amount to an open-border
policy. Even the most enthusiastic supporters of the territorial model
admit that a state has the right and obligation to control the composition
of the state by regulating who crosses its borders." At the border, the
26.
The various categories of aliens authorized to be in the United States are
catalogued in the Immigration and Nationality Act. See U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006)
(nonimmigrant aliens, including visitors for pleasure and temporary workers), id. §
1101(a)(20) (2006) (aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence).
27.
See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CrrlZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1-2 (6th ed. 2008) (depicting the various levels of
membership in the status-based model as concentric circles of membership, with
citizens forming the core membership ring).
28.
Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 6, at 389-90; Joseph H. Carens, On
Belonging: What We Owe People Who Stay, BOSTON REV., Summer 2005, at 16; Owen
Fiss, The Imnigrantas Pariah,BOSTON REV. Oct.-Nov. 1998, at 4.
29.
In Linda Bosniak's terms, this is a "separation," rather than a
'convergence" approach because the decision of whether to allow someone in is
separate from the decision of what rights to give that person once he is on the inside.
Bosniak, Membership, supra note 22, at 1101-10.
30.
WALZER, supranote 16, at 61-63 (distinguishing the control of admissions
from the distribution of rights within the territory).
31.
See, e.g., id. at 31 ("The idea of distributive justice presupposes a
bounded world within which distributions take place: a group of people committed to
dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods, first of all among themselves.");
Bosniak, Exclusion, supranote 22, at 963 ("Exclusion at the borders, in other words, is

FracturedMembership
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state may select among applicants for admission based on the criteria of
its choosing.32 However, under a strictly territorial approach, once an
individual has entered the territory, the state is obligated to afford her
membership rights."
B. Territorialityand Complex Equality
Michael Walzer's theory of complex equality, which has become a
foundation for modem discussions of territoriality and membership,'
explains territoriality's seemingly inconsistent approach to membership
in which the state must treat individuals within its borders as members
regardless of what the state's decision regarding that individual might
have been at the border." Complex equality describes a system in
which goods-including intangibles such as love, honor, and powerare distributed to individuals without regard to the individual's
possession or lack of another good.( This is a familiar and instinctive
concept that orders our everyday membership questions. An individual
is not entitled to city library borrowing privileges, for example, by
virtue of her Rotary Club membership.
Rather, complex equality requires that there be an "intrinsic
connection" between the good distributed and the principle of
distribution. Thus, from my earlier example, the separation of the
Rotary Club from city library privileges indicates a judgment that
community leadership, required for membership in the Rotary Club, is
not intrinsically related to responsible library patronage. Walzer sums
up complex equality: "No social good x should be distributedto men
and women who possess some other good y merely because they
possess y and without regardto the meaning ofx." "
a necessary condition of a thriving membership within."). But see Mark Tushnet, Open
Borders, BOSTON REV., Oct.-Nov. 1998, at 18, 18 ("[The long-term goal of
immigration policy should be open borders and fairly easy naturalization . ... ").
See WALZER, supranote 16, at 33-35.
32.
See id.; Bosniak, Being Here, supranote 6, at 395-96.
33.
See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN 49 (2006) (noting the
34.
"enormous contribution" Walzer made to "theoretical debates on immigration across
the disciplines").
See WALZER, supra note 16, at 63 (insisting that admission and alienage
35.
law "must vindicate at one and the same time the (limited) right of closure and the
political inclusiveness of the existing communities"). Linda Bosniak refers to this as the
"hard on the outside and soft on the inside" quality of territoriality. See BOSNIAK, THE
CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 34, at 4; Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 6, at

392, 395-96.
36.

WALZER, supranote 16, at 17-18.

37.
38.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
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From this foundational proposition, Walzer argues that the
decision to formally admit someone into the territory-to afford
someone a legal status-should remain separate from the decision to
distribute membership rights available within the territory because those
goods are not necessarily intrinsically related. 9 The goods being
distributed in each decision, for Walzer, belong to different "spheres"
of distributive justice because the state's decision to admit an individual
into the territory may properly be decided by political will,' but a
state's power to distribute rights within the territory is "entirely
constrained" by moral concerns.41 In more simplistic terms, formal
membership in the polity is a separate, unrelated question from
membership in the community-they are different clubs.
As I describe in Part II, Walzer's conception of membership holds
true in many aspects of U.S. law. Many laws that do not directly
govern the movement of people across borders have been governed by
territoriality. Thus, aliens, both documented and undocumented, have
traditionally been afforded extensive rights on account of their presence
within U.S. borders despite not having been afforded a legal status (a
good distributed in a different sphere).4 2

39.
Id. at 31-63.
40.
See id. at 31. Although Walzer ascribes the state's power to admit
individuals at the border to its right of political will-"Admission and exclusion are at
the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of selfdetermination"-he acknowledges that this power is also bounded by other principles,
including the principle of mutual aid, which requires the state to provide assistance to a
stranger where the assistance is urgently required and poses no risk to the assisting
state. Id. at 33, 45. See id. at 62 ("But self-determination in the sphere of membership
is not absolute.").
41.
Id. at 62 ("Immigration, then, is both a matter of political choice and
moral constraint. .. . [Tihe rule of citizens over non-citizens, of members over
strangers, is probably the most common form of tyranny in human history.").
Linda Bosniak has written extensively about the implications of Michael
42.
Walzer's work in immigration and alienage law. See, e.g., Bosniak, Membersnp,
supranote 22. Bosniak analyzes the divergence between the treatment of undocumented
immigrants within the realm of immigration law and the treatment of undocumented
immigrants outside the realm of immigration law through the lens of complex equality.
See id. at 1088-1137. She equates Walzer's "membership sphere" to the realm
occupied by U.S. immigration law-rules about who may be admitted into the territory
and on what conditions. See id. at 1090. Decisions made within this realm are "inside"
the sphere of membership regulation, while decisions made in other realms are
"outside" the sphere of membership regulation. See id. at 1059. Tracing key alienage
law decisions, Bosniak argues that alienage law is characterized by a struggle to
categorize an issue as one that properly falls inside or outside the sphere of membership
regulation. See id.at 1047, 1090.
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C. The Trouble with Territoriality:A Model without Modem
Justfication?
Complex equality gives a structural foundation for the separation
of membership distribution at the border from membership distribution
within the border, but it fails to provide a full explanation for
territoriality. Even accepting Walzer's claim that the treatment of
individuals within the territory is "entirely constrained" by moral
concerns, what moral concerns require the distribution of full
membership rights to everyone within the territory? Why elevate
territorial presence above all other considerations? As I argue below,
territoriality is merely a proxy, and a very inadequate one, for more
fundamental indicators of membership and broader concerns about the
character of the nation-state. Territoriality assumes that territorial
presence leads to the conditions under which an individual should be
considered a member. Three possible rationales underlie territoriality.
First, distributing membership rights equally within the state territory
preserves the character of the community by avoiding the creation of a
caste of inhabitants with fewer rights than citizens. Second, because a
state may impose obligations upon all individuals within its territory
regardless of status, it must also afford corresponding protections to its
subjects. Third, an individual's territorial presence within the state
cultivates connections between the individual and the other individuals
and entities within the state that should not be severed. While intuitively
appealing, these rationales do not completely account for territoriality
and ultimately expose some of the weaknesses in territoriality's modern
application.
1. COMMUNITY PRESERVATION

One potential rationale for territoriality is the community
preservation rationale.' Under this rationale, equality of membership is
important, not because all individuals deserve membership rights
equally, but because equality of membership preserves the nature of the
community. This argument is not about fairness to strangers, but about
preservation of a system, for example, egalitarianism is worth
preserving because those who were already here desire to live in an
egalitarian community and do not want to risk becoming a part of a
43.

Others have called this the anti-caste or anti-subjugation principle.

Bosniak, Being Here, supranote 6, at 392-95; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1515 (2d ed. 1988). However, because the terms suggest a
moral concern for the well-being of the "other," rather than the concern for the
preservation of a certain type of society, I use an alternate label. See also WALzER,
supra note 16, at 61-62 ("At stake here is the shape of the community . . - .").
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future sub-class of members. Under this rationale, even an individual's
consent to sub-standard treatment could not justify unequal treatment
because the effect would be the same-the perpetuation of a secondclass caste." Thomas Jefferson's statement in opposition to the Alien
Friends Act, Alien Enemies Act, and Sedition Act in 1798 embraces
this notion: "[T]he friendless alien has indeed been selected as the
safest subject of a first experiment; but the citizen will soon follow
"45

Self-preservation explains, at least in part, various scholars' and
courts' espousal of territoriality." Owen Fiss, for example, has argued
that the principle of self-preservation is implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment as "a statement about how society wishes to organize
itself, and prohibits subjugation, even voluntary subjugation, because
such a practice would disfigure society." 47 Indeed, "[w]e ought not to
subjugate immigrants, not because we owe them anything, but to
preserve our society as a community of equals.""
2. MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION
A second possible rationale for territoriality is the mutuality of
obligation rationale: the state owes individuals within the territory
membership rights because those individuals are subject to the
obligations imposed by the state."9 Under this rationale, territorial
presence evidences the individual's acceptance of the state's jurisdiction
over her.o
This concept of reciprocal obligations flows from Westphalian
notions of territorial sovereignty in which the nation-state is a unitary,
self-contained actor with complete and exclusive jurisdiction over the
people within its territory. 5 ' Likewise, no state has power to act within
See Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 6, at 392-95.
44.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Draftsof the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 7 THE
45.
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1795-1801, at 289, 303 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1896).
See, e.g., Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 6, at 407 ("[If we do not
46.
extend rights and recognition to co-inhabitants, ... we will, to that extent, poison the
democratic community at its heart."); Fiss, supra note 28, at 6.
Fiss, supranote 28, at 6.
47.
48.
Id.
See NEUMAN, supra note 4, at 107-08 (describing territoriality as based on
49.
mutuality of obligation).
See id.
50.
51.
Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2501,
2508-11 (2005) (tracing territoriality back to the Peace of Westphalia). This view of
sovereignty was a significant departure from the pre-Westphalian vassal system of rule
in which complex networks of feudal allegiance and political rule overlapped without
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the borders of another nation-state.52 Thus, in a Westphalian world, a
nation-state may only impose obligations on and protect the population
within its territorial borders. It follows that where an individual resides,
rather than who the individual is, determines which rules apply. That
is, presence within the nation-state's territory determines an
individual's obligations. The nation-state, in turn, affords those
individuals whatever membership rights and benefits it has undertaken
to provide residents.'
The mutuality of obligation rationale for territoriality makes
perfect sense in a purely Westphalian system. The reality, however, is
that states often do impose obligations outside their borders and
selectively suspend obligations within their own territory." Embassies,
for example, function as islands of immunity from the obligations
imposed by the host state within its territory even though embassies
operate within the host state's territory. States have also historically

regard to geographic boundaries. See Stbphane Beaulac, The Westphalian Model in
Defining InternationalLaw. Challengingthe Myth, 8 AusTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 181, 18186 (2004), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AJLH/2004/9.html; Leo
Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1649-1948, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 20, 34 (1948). Then,
it was membership in a vassal network that mattered, and membership was established
through professed allegiance to a vassal lord, which both secured land and protection
and imposed obligations. See Beaulac, supra, at 189. However, allegiance to one vassal
lord did not preclude allegiance to another; thus, "[fleudal lines of obligation resembled
a system of arteries in a body, not a pyramid with an apex." DANIEL PHILPOTT,
REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: How IDEAS SHAPED MODERN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 79 (2001).
See M.S. Janis, Sovereignty and InternationalLaw. Hobbes and Grotius,
52.
in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 391, 393 (Ronald St. John Macdonald ed.,
1994).
Raustiala, supranote 51, at 2514-15.
53.
The principle of mutuality of obligation closely relates to the concept of
54.
government with limited powers. A government of limited power only has the power to
act in a certain way, subject to significant restraints that are in place to protect
individual liberties. In a sense, this institutionalizes the notion of mutual obligations: the
government can only obligate its residents when acting under the restraints of
corresponding individual protections. Any other course of action is legally impossible
because the government simply does not have the power to do anything else. See
Bosniak, Being Here, supranote 6, at 408 ("To the extent that a state exercises power
in a territorial space . . . every person present within that space and 'subject to the

jurisdiction' of that power, should be armed with individual protections against its
exercise.").
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 25 (1999);
55.
see also Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201-06
(1996).
Raustiala, supra note 51, at 2510 (also offering the principle of sanctuary,
56.
areas that were "plainly within a prince's territorial realm yet into which secular law
could not reach," as an example of lapses in territorial sovereignty).
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had extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain crimes" and routinely pass
laws to govern their nationals abroad. 8 This incongruous relationship
between modem notions of jurisdiction has led some to call for the
rejection of territoriality, at least as far as it limits protections for
individuals outside of U.S. borders, and the adoption of a model based
entirely on mutuality of obligation."
3. COMMUNITY TIES
Joseph Carens, along with others, has defended territoriality based
on a community ties rationale:
Whatever their legal status, individuals who live in a society
over an extended period of time become members of that
society, as their lives intertwine with the lives of others there.
These human bonds provide the basic contours of the rights
that a state must guarantee; they cannot be regarded as a
matter of political discretion.?
Under this view of territoriality, territorial presence serves as an
indicator of an individual's ties to other individuals and entities within
the territorial boundaries of the state. This view of territoriality is
attractive in its recognition of real human relationships as a basic social
fabric, but the question remains: what is it about the existence of human
relationships that requires the bestowal of membership rights?
One possibility is that an individual's ties to the surrounding
community foster commitment and loyalty to those around her. As an
individual becomes dependent on her surrounding community, her
Universal jurisdiction over piracy, which has a long history in
57.
international law, is illustrative. Since the first part of the seventeenth century,
international norms allow any state that captures a pirate on the high seas (outside the
state's territory) to try and punish the pirate, regardless of the pirate's nationality, the
location of the crime being punished, or the location of the pirate's capture. See Eugene
Kontorovich, The Pracy Analogy: Modem Umversal Jurisdicton's Hollow
Foundadon, 45 HARv. INT'L L.J. 183, 190 (2004) (challenging the argument that
universal jurisdictions over heinous crimes and violations of human rights is analogous
to universal jurisdiction over piracy).
58.
For example, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd1 (2006), penalizes U.S. business entities for the bribery of foreign officials to obtain a
business advantage, despite the fact that this often occurs outside of U.S. territory.
59.
Raustiala, supranote 51, at 2504 (advocating the adoption of a "rebuttable
presumption that when legal power is brought to bear, so too are legal protections").
60.
Carens, supranote 28, at 16; see also Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 6,
at 404. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LosT STORY
OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006) (suggesting a
membership model based on "affiliations").
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personal interests align with those of the community. The individual is
therefore more likely to make valuable contributions to the community
and refrain from harming it in order to augment her own existence
within the community. Affording membership rights to such an
individual rewards her contribution.
A second possibility is that as strangers develop ties to the
surrounding community, they begin to help define its character. In
other words, not only do the individual's ties to the community merit
the individual's inclusion as a member, but the community's ties to the
individual require inclusion of that individual. By including such an
individual, the state preserves the community's character, which is a
function of its members' social affiliations. This argument is merely a
restatement of what I have termed the "community preservation
rationale." That is, those who are members owe individuals who have
formed ties to the community nothing. Rather, they owe it to the
community-to themselves-to preserve those ties and the community
built on those ties."
A third reason community ties may require the distribution of
membership rights equally within territorial boundaries derives from a
social contract theory of government.62 The very existence of the state,
under this view, is a result of individuals needing to collectively meet
obligations to each other. 3 These obligations arise from relationships
among individuals-from social connections, which generate reciprocal
obligations between individuals.( Thus, when a stranger forms social
ties with individuals who are "members" of the state, those members

61,
Although Walzer does not systematically discuss the rationales for
territoriality, he suggests that a community's ties to an individual are important
indicators of membership. First, Walzer specifically mentions "actual contacts,
connections, alliances we have established" with strangers as factors weighing in favor
of formal membership in the state. WALZER, supra note 16, at 32. Walzer points to
U.S. immigration policy, which favors a certain type of social connection-family
relationships-by providing a means for preexisting members to bring those with whom
they have social ties to live within the same community. Id. at 41 (referring to this as
the "kinship principle"). Second, Walzer stresses the importance of the community's
ties to and dependence on the individual, rather than the individual's ties to the
community, in his discussion about the treatment of individuals within the territory. See
id.at 31-35. He challenges the concept of guest worker programs, in which immigrants
are admitted into the territory but denied certain rights: "[G]uest workers are not
'guests' ..... They are workers, above all .... They do socially necessary work, and
they are deeply enmeshed in the legal system of the country to which they have come."
Id. at 59-60.
See Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Jusdee: A Social
62.
ConnecdonModel, 23 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 102, 105 (2006).
63.
See id.at 106.
64.
See id. at 104-05.
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take on obligations to those strangers.6 The members then discharge
their obligations to the stranger through the state.' In that sense, an
individual's ties to the community are, in effect, ties to the state,
which, in turn, generate obligations and expectations between the state
and the stranger.' Under this view, the community ties rationale for
territoriality is nothing more than a restatement of the reciprocal
obligation rationale, discussed above. Community ties simply serve to
help explain the origin of reciprocal obligations.
Despite the appeal of the community ties rationale, it does not hold
up well in practice. First, in today's world, ties (and any resulting
obligations) to other individuals and entities do not necessarily depend
on physical proximity." In fact, as the popularity of Internet-based
social networking sites suggests, individuals may easily maintain
affiliations with individuals in other countries. It is also entirely
possible for an individual to have very few affiliations with those inside
the country in which he or she resides. Moreover, even where an
individual does have ties to others within the same nation-state, these
affiliations may stem from shared interest, familial ties, professional
obligations, etc., rather than from physical proximity. In a large
country like the United States, people may very well happen to live in
the same country, but they may live hundreds of miles apart.
Second, territoriality's binary conception of members and
nonmembers does not coincide with this affiliation-focused rationale.
The types, depth, and number of community ties vary by individual.
Community ties distribute across a spectrum, not a on a binary toggle.
Is there a threshold number and type of connections required of a
"member"? If community ties underlie territoriality, should an
individual with more connection to the surrounding community have a
greater claim on membership rights than one whose only connection to
the surrounding community is mere presence in it?
II. TERRITORIALITY'S METAMORPHOSIS OUTSIDE THE EMPLOYMENT
SPHERE
Perhaps because of the weaknesses in territoriality's theoretical
underpinnings, exposed by an increasingly globalized world,

65.
66.

See id. at 106.
Id. at 123.

67.

See id.at 116, 123.

For a discussion of "place" and its overstated relationship with identity
68.
and responsibility, see Doreen Massey, Geographies of Responsibility, 86B
GEOGRAFIsKA ANNALER 5 (2004), available at http://oro.open.ac.uk/7224/1/
Geographies of responsibilitySept03.pdf.
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territoriality's role in U.S. law has begun to wane. However, the statusbased model has not replaced territoriality. Instead, territoriality is
undergoing a transformation: it is shedding its preoccupation with
geography and instead turning to more fundamental indicators of
membership. This transformation is evident in the historical progression
of alienage law and notions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.69 While early
courts adopted territoriality's broad inclusivity within the border to
eliminate many distinctions between aliens and citizens living in the
United States, recent courts have suggested that territorial presence
alone is not enough. Outside the border, territoriality's exclusionary
force has also declined-in some circumstances, the law follows the
flag across geographic borders.
In this Part, I explore territoriality's role in U.S. law. I track the
United States' early adoption and adherence to strict territoriality, as
well as the subsequent decline and partial abandonment of territoriality.
I argue that the trend away from strict territoriality is not an acceptance
of the status-based model, but an effort to distribute membership based
on more fundamental indicators of membership-indicators that once
correlated with territorial presence but no longer do. The more flexible
territoriality seen in recent cases signals courts' recognition that
territoriality, applied strictly in modem circumstances, actually
undermines its underlying rationales."o Courts are now asking more
principled questions about membership, questions that territoriality is
no longer capable of answering." Using courts' reasons for, in the
beginning, adhering to territoriality and, later, rejecting or altering
Commentators often treat territoriality's inclusion of individuals within the
69.
border and its exclusion of individuals outside the borders as two separate bodies of
law. Territoriality's inclusionary properties take center stage in discussions of
citizenship and alienage law. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and
Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1879, 1888-89 (2007); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 554 (1990). Territoriality's
exclusionary side, on the other hand, plays a role in analyses of the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. constitutional protections. See, e.g., Christina Duffy Burnett, A
Convenient Constitution? ExtraternitorialityAfter Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
973, 974-78 (2009); Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary
Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1333, 1361-62 (2007).
However, territoriality's exclusionary and inclusionary attributes are merely opposite
sides of the same coin-inclusion within the border means something only because of
exclusion outside the border. Although my ultimate focus in this Article is on alienage
law-the treatment of aliens inside the United States-it is useful to talk about
territoriality in its entirety because the rationales for denying membership rights to
someone outside the border are the same as the rationales for bestowing membership
rights to those within the border.
70.
See infr Part II.B.
71.
See infra Parts I.B-C.
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territoriality, I suggest that a new post-territorial approach to
membership based on the rationales that originally drove territoriality is
emerging. Later, in Part III, I will argue that this post-territorial model
should apply in the employment sphere as well, despite the status-based
model's encroachment into that sphere.
A. Territorialityin Early U S. La w
Early U.S. case law displayed a rigid adherence to territoriality, at
first without any explicit rationale for doing so. However, subsequent
opinions espoused territoriality on the basis of the rationales discussed
in Part I. Courts strove to conserve the character of the U.S.
community as a whole, preserve community ties, and reciprocate
immigrants' obligation to be governed under U.S. law. Territoriality, it
turned out, fairly effectively accomplished those goals and therefore
governed the distribution of membership rights within the United
States, as well as outside.
1. INSIDE THE BORDER

Both the exclusionary and inclusionary sides of territoriality have a
long tradition in U.S. law. 72 Within the United States, territorial

See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (prohibiting a state from
72.
denying undocumented children within the U.S. the right to public education because
they are within the territory); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 234-35
(1896) (holding that Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to all within U.S. territory); In
re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (denying right to trial by jury on the basis that the
claimant was outside of U.S. territory); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(holding that the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens
within U.S. territory). Of course, translating this model into a practical mechanism for
sorting members from nonmembers has required significant interpretation and
development of concepts. First, and most obviously, there is room for debate about
where U.S. boundaries are located and what constitutes U.S. territory. (This was
arguably the crux of the dispute over the detention cases of Bounediene v. Bush, 128
S. Ct. 2229 (2008), and Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).) Second, courts
have limited the scope of territorial presence through a series of legal fictions that may
render a person "not here" for purposes of the law even though the person is physically
present in the U.S. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213
(1953). On this principle, the Supreme Court held that an alien denied admission to the
United States and held indefinitely at Ellis Island had no right to a hearing, as otherwise
would be guaranteed by due process, because "harborage at Ellis Island is not an entry
into the United States." Id. Although this legal fiction served to fit the detention into
the mold of territoriality, it hardly comported with the rationales of territoriality,
especially the community ties rationale: The petitioner had been a twenty-five-year
resident of the United States prior to leaving its shores for an extended trip to thencommunist Eastern Europe to visit his mother. Id. at 208-09. He was held for twenty-
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presence, rather than status, has historically secured basic constitutional
Early Supreme Court precedent,
protections for immigrants.
beginning with Yick Wo v. Hopkins'4 in 1886, explicitly adopted strict
territoriality as the governing model in alienage law decisions.75 In Yick
Wo, the Supreme Court struck down a San Francisco laundry licensing
ordinance that was disproportionately enforced against Chinese laundry
operators.' The Court found that the ordinances' ultimate effect, if not
purpose, of "driv[ing] out of business all the numerous small laundries,
especially those owned by Chinese, and giv[ing] a monopoly of the
business to the large institutions established . . . by means of large

associated Caucasian capital" was impermissible." The petitioners, two
Chinese nationals who ran laundry businesses in San Francisco, were
entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment by virtue of
being in the United States, despite the then-current prohibition on the
immigration of Chinese laborers:78 "These provisions [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality. . . ."7 Although the Court gave no explanation
for its rigid adherence to territoriality, Yick Wo's inclusiveness, as
well as the Court's separation of border-related matters from internal
matters, became entrenched in U.S. alienage law, as evidenced by
subsequent Supreme Court cases."
Nine years after Yick Wo, the Supreme Court arguably took a
territorial view of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in Wong Wing v.
one months before being allowed to rejoin his wife at his home in Buffalo, New York.
Id.
73.
David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 978 (2002)
("[R]elatively little turns on citizenship status. The right to vote and the right to run for
federal elective office are restricted to citizens, but all of the other rights are written
without such limitation.").
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
74.
75.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 374.
76.
77.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 358, 374. Under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Congress
78.
suspended immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years. Gabriel Chin et al., The
Ongins of PlenaryPower, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7, 8 (David A. Martin & Peter H.
Schuck eds., 2005). Under the Act, Chinese immigration dropped from 39,000
immigrants in 1882 to ten immigrants in 1887. Id. While the U.S. population more than
doubled between 1880 and 1920, the Chinese-U.S. population dropped by over a third.
Id. at 8.
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
79.
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that Equal
80.
Protection requires states to provide public education to undocumented children); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (using reasoning in Yick Wo to extend
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to aliens within U.S. territory).
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United States.!' There, the Court rejected the government's proposition
that it could sentence aliens who had violated immigration laws to hard
labor without first holding a jury trial.82 The Court relied on Yick Wo:
Applying [ Yick Wo's ] reasoning to the fifth and sixth
amendments, it must be concluded that all persons within the
territory of the United States are entitled to the protection
guaranteed by those amendments, and that even aliens shall
not be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law.
The Court again failed to explain its rationale for employing
territoriality, but, as in Yick Wo, the Court separated the distribution of
rights at the border from the distribution of rights within the border.
Even though the petitioner had violated immigration laws-border
rules-and was subject to deportation, his imprisonment was not itself
border control but a matter of criminal punishment, a sphere subject to
constitutional restraints.84
In later cases, and perhaps due to increasing doubts about the logic
of affording rights to those without authorization to be here,' courts
began to explain their adherence to territoriality. The Supreme Court's
opinion in Plyler v. Doe" reaffirmed territoriality's role in U.S.
alienage law and offered a defense of territoriality." Doe involved a
Texas statute that prohibited the use of state funds for the education of
unauthorized immigrant children and allowed local public schools to
deny enrollment to such children." The Court struck down the statute,
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment "reaches into every corner of a
State's territory" to protect everyone within the state, citizen and alien
alike." Status, the Court held, was irrelevant: "That a person's initial
entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he
Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 234-35.
81.
Id. at 237.
82.
Id. at 238.
83.
See Bosniak, Membership, supra note 22, at 1096-98 (using Wong Wing
84.
to illustrate the applicability of Michael Walzer's principle of complex equality and
sphere separation in U.S. law).
See, e.g., Denny Chin, Aliens' Right to Work: State and Federal
85.
Discrimination, 2 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REv. 447 (1979) (discussing discriminatory
labor laws in regards to immigrants); Panel Finds Faws in Jmmigration Law, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 14, 1980, at 27 (discussing the Fourth Amendment rights granted in
immigration hearings).
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
86.
Id. at 213-15.
87.
Id. at 205.
88.
Id. at 210-11, 215.
89.
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may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his
presence within the State's territorial perimeter.""
The Court accounted for this "territorial theme" 9' in U.S. alienage
law with reference to two of the rationales introduced in Part I above.
First, the Court offered mutuality of obligation as a rationale for
territoriality.' According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to "all upon whom the State would impose the obligations of its
laws," that is, everyone within the territorial jurisdiction of the state:'
"[T]he obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can
be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own
jurisdiction."' Briefly put, the state could not impose obligations on its
residents without also providing benefits-the state and its residents
were mutually obligated to one another by virtue of the state's
jurisdiction over its territory and the individual's presence within that
territory.
Second, the Court emphasized territoriality's ability to preserve the
national community's character.95 Under this rationale, offering
unauthorized immigrant children a public education is necessary, not as
a matter of fairness to individual immigrants, but because education
"has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.""
According to the Court, we must afford unauthorized immigrants a
public education in order to preserve "a democratic system of
government,"
ensure that individuals will be able to "lead
economically productive lives to the benefit of us all,"" and "sustain[]
our political and cultural heritage . . . ."

The existence of an

underclass of immigrants, systematically deprived of rights, would
seriously undermine "a Nation that prides itself on adherence to
principles of equality under law.""
Yick Wo and its progeny took a strong hold in American alienage
law. Under what has been referred to as the "Yick Wo tradition" of

90.
Id. at 215.
91.
Id. at 212.
92.
Id. at 214.
93.
Id. (examining the congressional debate surrounding the Fourteenth
Amendment).
94.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 221.
95.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100. Id. at 219.
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territoriality,'o' aliens have enjoyed and continue to enjoy a large array
of rights and benefits, including the right to enter into and enforce
contracts, buy and sell property, marry, and sue in tort." Immigrants,
regardless of status, have essentially been deemed "members" for
matters on the "in" side of the border.
2. OUTSIDE THE BORDER
Territoriality's exclusionary side-its denial of membership rights
to those outside of the territory's geographic boundaries-has also
played a significant role in U.S. law. In re Ross,"os an early example of
territoriality's exclusionary attributes, governed the application of U.S.
constitutional law abroad for several decades"'" In Ross, a U.S.
consular court had found a sailor employed on a U.S. merchant shipos
guilty of murder." Ross challenged his conviction on Sixth
Amendment grounds, claiming his right to a trial by jury had been
violated. " The Court denied that Ross had a right to a trial by jury at
all and held that the consular court could not have violated the U.S.
Constitution because "[t]he Constitution can have no operation in
another country."'" The Court, in effect, defended the territorially
based denial of constitutional rights based on the absence of mutual
obligations between the petitioner and the U.S. government.'" 9 The
101. See Bosniak, Membersip,supra note 22, at 1060 & n.39 (cataloguing the
widespread association of Yick Wo with broader alienage law).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) ("All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other."); see also Buck v. Stankovic, No. 3:07-CV0717, 2008 WL 4072656, at *1, 6, 20 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2008) (granting attorneys'
fees to an undocumented immigrant that had been refused a marriage license where an
injunction ordering granting of the license had previously been ordered); King v.
ZirMed, Inc., No. 3:05CV-181-H, 2007 WL 3306100, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 2007)
(holding that denying undocumented workers the right to contract flies in the face of 42
U.S.C. 1981); Shen v. A & P Food Stores, No. 93 CV 1184 (FB), 1995 WL 728416,
at *1-3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1995) (holding that refusing to sell groceries to an
immigrant is a denial of the right to contract).
103. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
104. Raustiala, supra note 51, at 2517.
105. The Court treated the sailor as a constructive U.S. citizen but indicated
that the outcome would have remained the same whether he were a citizen or not. In re
Ross, 140 U.S. at 478-79.
106. Id. at 454.
107. Id. at 458-59.
108. Id. at 464.
109. Id. at 464-65.
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Court suggested that the United States had no sovereign authority to
apply its laws-either to impose an obligation or offer protection-to
individuals outside its territory."o Rather, the United States' authority
to hold consular adjudication of crimes abroad, the Court explained, is
entirely a product of an agreement made with the host country in an
effort to reduce the burden of the obhgadons that the host country
would otherwise have imposed upon the individual. "' The Court further
stated that
[w]hile, therefore, in one aspect the American accused of
crime committed in those countries is deprived of the
guaranties of the constitution against unjust accusation and a
partial trial, yet in another aspect he is the gainer, in being
withdrawn from the procedure of their tribunals, often
arbitrary and oppressive, and sometimes accompanied with
extreme cruelty and torture." 2
Ross's strict territorial approach to the question of whether the
Constitution follows the flag persisted into the middle of the last
century and gave rise to heated debates about what, exactly, constituted
U.S. territory. Was it any territory under U.S. military power? Was it
only incorporated states? In the Insular Cases,"3 which involved the
applicability of the Constitution to then-recent U.S. acquisitions such as
the Philippines and Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court formulated the rule
that the Constitution applied in full in incorporated territories destined
for statehood." 4 Yet for almost a century of U.S. history, the
Constitution did not follow the flag outside of U.S. territory."'

110. Id. at 464 ("When, therefore, the representatives or officers of our
government are permitted to exercise authority of any ind in another country, it must
be on such conditions as the two countries may agree; the laws of neither one being
obligatoryupon the other.") (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 464-65.
112. Id. at 465.
113. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v.
Manldchi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903), limited by Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243
(1901); Dooley v. UnitedStates, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
1 (1901). But see, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) ("The 'Insular Cases'
can be distinguished from the present cases in that they involved the power of Congress
to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar
traditions and institutions whereas here the basis for governmental power is American
citizenship.").
114. See Dorr,195 U.S. at 143.
115. Pugh v. United States, 212 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1954).
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B. Territorialityin Recent U.S. History. The Beginning of the End?
Notwithstanding its long tenure in U.S. law, strict territoriality, in
both its inclusionary and exclusionary forms, has begun to weaken."'
Within the U.S., territoriality's dominance is faltering. Rights and
benefits that once hinged on territorial presence now require something
more, although exactly what more remains unclear. Abroad,
territoriality has given way to a more flexible membership model under
which citizens and some aliens abroad are entitled to constitutional
protections. Notably, though, even as courts rely less and less on
geography as a basis for the distribution of membership rights, the new,
more flexible approach to the distribution of membership rights furthers
the very same rationales offered by earlier courts in defense of
territoriality. As it turns out, courts have not abandoned a commitment
to valuing de facto membership, it is territoriality that seems to be
failing as a reliable indicator of de facto membership. Community ties,
mutuality of obligation, and community preservation now play an
increasingly direct role in the distribution of membership rights. They
are now more than underlying rationales: these principles form the very
structure of an emerging post-territorial membership model.
None of this is to say that there is no cause for concern over the
rejection of territoriality in alienage law.' Territoriality has served to
secure undocumented immigrants access to fundamental rights and
protections-a cause with which I sympathize. Certainly, territoriality
offers predictability and consistency that cannot be matched by a more
flexible, even principled, approach. Without the clear dictates of
territoriality, it is easy to wander from territoriality's appealing
inclusivity into a status-based approach that ignores the realities of
immigrants' lives. However, defending territoriality in today's
interconnected world is difficult, and courts have had to adjust for these
changes in questions of law both inside and outside the border.
1. INSIDE THE BORDER

Some of the first hints of territoriality's waning applicability within
U.S. territory appeared in the Supreme Court's opinion in United States
116. See Raustiala, supra note 51, at 2513-28 (tracking the dominance of
territoriality in U.S. law and advocating the abandonment of strict territoriality to bar
the constitutional claims of aliens abroad).
117. For articles supporting territoriality, see Bosniak, Being Here, supra note
6, at 389; Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Cidzenship Paradoxin a TransnadonalAge, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1127 (2008) (reviewing HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN
WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES

(2006)).
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v. Verdugo-Urquidez." There, a plurality of Court suggested that
territorial presence may not be enough for some membership rights to
attach."' The case addresses principally Fourth Amendment rights 2 0
and re-characterized Yick Wo and its progeny: "These cases ...
establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections when they
have come within the territory of the United States and developed
substantialconnections with this county." 12' The defendant, a Mexican
national who had been brought to the United States against his will
while U.S. law enforcement agents searched his house in Mexico
without a warrant,122 had not established such connections:
[T]his sort of presence-lawful but involuntary-is not of the
sort to indicate any substantial connection with our
country .... We do not think the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to the search of premises in Mexico should turn
on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the custodian of its
nonresident alien owner had or had not transported him to the
United States at the time the search was made.123
Despite its disenchantment with territoriality, the plurality
ultimately conformed to a territorial approach: it was the location of the
defendant's home outside of U.S. territory on which the plurality rested
the denial of Fourth Amendment rights.124 However, the plurality's
explicit effort to recast prior territorially based decisions as espousing a
118. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). In Verdugo-Urquidez, Justices Kennedy, White,
O'Connor, and Scalia joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion. See id. at 261. However,
because Justice Kennedy's concurrence diverged substantially from the reasoning of the
Court, even rejecting the Court's fundamental line of reasoning, commentators and
courts have referred to the Court's opinion as a plurality opinion. See, e.g., Lamont v.
Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that a "plurality of the
Court" subscribed to Justice Rehnquist's definition of "the people"); Randall K. Miller,
The Limits of U.S. International Law Enforcement After Verdugo-Urquidez:
ResurrectingRochin, 58 U. Pir. L. REv. 867, 867 n.3 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman,
Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 972 (1991) ("Rehnquist seemed to really be
speaking for a plurality of four."); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to
Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 667, 681 (2003) ("Somewhat bafflingly, Justice Kennedy
disagreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis but nonetheless joined the majority
opinion in full, providing the fifth vote for the Court's opinion.").
119. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75.
120. The Court first held that because the search at issue occurred outside the
United States, the Fourth Amendment did not apply. Id. at 264-66. However, in
response to the petitioner's argument that his presence within U.S. borders triggered
Fourth Amendment rights, the Court then considered the issue. Id. at 274-75.
121. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 262.
123. Id. at 271-72.
124. Id. at 274-75.
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more nuanced approach to membership indicates a shift away from
strict territoriality.
While Verdugo-Urquidez poses a significant threat to longstanding expectations of equal constitutional protection for aliens within
U.S. borders, Verdugo-Urquidez does not, by its terms, extinguish
immigrants' claims to protection. Rather, it acknowledges that
territorial presence is a poor measure of community ties and
connections. With Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court suggests that
territoriality is an unnecessary intermediary. While it may have served
as a valuable shortcut in membership analysis in the past, it no longer
accurately represents the community ties that are essential to de facto
membership.?2
125. Unfortunately, a series of subsequent Fourth Amendment cases involving
previously deported undocumented immigrants highlights the potential for the statusbased approach to encroach into Fourth Amendment analysis under the guise of
recognizing community ties. The court in United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F.
Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003), af'd on other grounds, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004),
in an opinion that expressly treated the issue as one of membership, based its denial of
Fourth Amendment rights to a previously deported felonious alien on VerdugoUrquidezs "substantial connection" test. Id. at 1260-61. The court found EsparzaMenodoza's connections to the United States, consisting of an illegal entry followed by
a felony conviction, deportation, and a second illegal entry, to be insufficient for Fourth
Amendment rights to attach: "[P]reviously deported alien felons," it held, "are not
covered by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1271. In doing so, the court explicitly
rejected territoriality as the governing model for distribution of Fourth Amendment
rights: "[Esparza-Mendoza] has managed to illegally enter Utah and, by virtue of that
fact alone, he is entitled to those rights which follow from mere presence in this
country. But he lacks entitlement to those rights which come from being a member of
American society-including Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 1271. Interestingly, the
court did not reconcile its acknowledgement that some constitutional rights are activated
by mere presence within the United States with Verdugo-Urquidez's suggestion that all
constitutional rights require such connections.
Although Esparza-Mendoza was affirmed on other grounds, 386 F.3d 953 (10th
Cir. 2004), its reasoning has found favor with several courts, and one court has held
that an undocumented immigrant can never satisfy Verdugo-Urquidez's substantial
connections test. See, e.g., United States v. Guderrez-Casada,553 F. Supp. 2d 1259,
1272 (D. Kan. 2008) (denying Fourth Amendment rights to a "previously deported,
aggravated felonious illegal alien who chose to reenter the United States knowing that
the sovereign country, by due process of law, had recently ordered him to leave and
stay out of the country"); United States v. Atienzo, No. 2:04-CR-00534, 2005 WL
3334785, at *5-6 (D. Utah Dec. 7, 2005) (agreeing with Espar-Mendoza's
categorical exclusion of previously deported felons but holding that a non-felon
deportee may have sufficient connections for protection under the Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Ullab, No. 04-CR-30A(F), 2005 WL 629487, *29-30 (W.D.N.Y.
Mar. 17, 2005); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-CA-41 1(KC), 2005
WL 388589 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005), aff'don other grounds, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir.
2006) (suggesting that unlawful entry into the country forecloses access to Fourth
Amendment rights but ultimately finding that a woman who had relied on a consular
official's assurance that she could legally enter the country with an expired border
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2. OUTSIDE THE BORDER

Territoriality's decline has not been limited to the treatment of
aliens within U.S. territory. Reid v. Covertl26 signaled a shift in the
Supreme Court's approach to the distribution of membership rights
outside U.S. borders that has diluted territoriality's exclusionary
attributes. In Reid, the Court held that two U.S. citizens living abroad
and convicted by a U.S. military court for the murder of their husbands
were protected by the Bill of Rights and enjoyed the right to a trial by
jury after indictment by a grand jury.'2" The Court viewed the issue
through a status-based lens, emphasizing the petitioners' status as U.S.
citizens:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill
of Rights.

. .

. When the Government reaches out to punish a

citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to
be in another land."
The Court thereby rejected the strictly territorial notion espoused in
Ross and the Insular Cases that the Constitution was inapplicable
abroad.129
While Reid's introduction of the status-based model into the
distribution of membership rights outside of U.S. territory expanded the
reach of Constitutional rights for citizens, it made no change in the noncrossing card because a replacement card had been issued but was in the mail was
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection).
Esparza-Mendoza and its progeny demonstrate the potential for the status-based
model to fill in any gaps left by the departure of territoriality. In those cases, the courts
arguably based their decisions on the defendant's status, not on their actual contacts
with the surrounding community. In fact, in each of those cases the court had little
information regarding the defendant's affiliations or connection with the United States.
Instead, the courts foreclosed the possibility of substantial connections on account of
unauthorized status (as augmented by a previous deportation). However, these cases, I
would argue, are merely misapplications of an emerging concept of membership that
considers actual community ties in the distribution of membership rights, rather than
mere territorial presence. See Espara-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1273, aff'd on
other grounds, 386 F.3d 953. The court, however, specifically declined to determine
whether an unauthorized immigrant that had never been deported would also lack a
sufficient connection to the U.S. to assert Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
126. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
127. Id. at 32-33.
128. Id. at 5-6.
129. Id. at 12.
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citizen's rights. Without sufficient legal status and without presence
within U.S. borders, the noncitizen stood outside the reach of
More recently, though, the Supreme
Constitutional protections.'
Court's opinion in Boumediene v. Bush'3 suggested that aliens, too,
may enjoy some Constitutional protection outside of U.S. borders.132
In Boumediene, the Court essentially faced a question of
membership-of which membership model to apply to determine
whether enemy combatant detainees held at Guantanamo Bay were
"members" for purposes of enjoying a right to the writ of habeas and
the protections of the Suspension Clause.133 In its lengthy opinion, the
Court struggled to define the contours of membership, acknowledging
that formal status and territorial presence within the U.S. were
traditional indicators of membership:
In deciding the constitutional questions now presented we
must determine whether petitioners are barred from seeking
the writ or invoking the protections of the Suspension Clause
either because of their status, i.e., petitioners' designation by
the Executive Branch as enemy combatants, or their physical
location, i.e., their presence at Guantanamo Bay.' 34
Despite the detainees' lack of status and territorial presence, the
Court held that Congress could not deny them the privilege of habeas
corpus without complying with the Suspension Clause.13 1 In rejecting a
strict territorial approach, the Court noted that some of the "prudential
considerations" relevant to the early British practice of withholding the
writ from individuals outside of England no longer apply.136 While
British courts arguably faced the prospect of being unable to enforce a
writ issued to an individual outside of England-specifically in Scotland
or Hanover-because of distance or conflicting local judgments, the
U.S., according to the Court, did not face the possibility that it would
be unable to enforce writs issued to detainees in Guantanamo. 37 Rather,

130. See Johnson v. Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1950) (explaining that
Yick Wo and its progeny conferred rights only to aliens within the U.S. territory;
outside of the U.S., aliens are at best strangers and at worst enemy combatants).
131. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
132. Id. at 2262.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2244.
135. Id. at 2262.
136. Id. at 2250.
137. Id. at 2251 ("The modem-day relations between the United States and
Guantanamo thus differ in important respects from the 18th-century relations between
England and the kingdoms of Scotland and Hanover.").
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"no law other than the laws of the United States applies at the naval
station,""' even though Cuba retains technical sovereignty over
Guantanamo. 39
In effect, the Court highlighted territoriality's failure to preserve
the notion of reciprocal or mutual obligations. The Court's argument
can, in part, be read as a critique of Westphalian notions of
territoriality: since governments can and do impose obligations abroad,
they also can and ought to afford corresponding protections.
C. Beyond Tenitorialhty
As evidenced by the discussion above, a bird's-eye view of
territoriality's role in U.S. law suggests that strict territoriality may not
survive into the next century. This is not to say that territory no longer
matters; it does. But territory no longer defines relationships in the way
it once did, nor does territory pose the impenetrable barrier of
sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction idealized by Westphalian
territorial preeminence. Territorial presence is thus no longer a
consistently adequate proxy for fundamental indicators of membership.
In territoriality's stead, a more flexible post-territorial membership
approach is emerging in which constructive membership is not based on
the fiction that territorial presence signifies de facto membership in a
society but on actual indicators of membership-community ties and
mutuality of obligation-as well as an effort to preserve the character of
the national community. Courts are looking to the rationales that
historically justified territoriality and evaluating membership with direct
reference to those rationales. In that sense, territoriality is not dying; it
is making a transformation to keep up with the realities of modernity.
Thus, courts are now asking and will likely increasingly be asking
whether an individual, or class of individuals, (1) has significant and
substantial ties to the surrounding community, and (2) is subject to U.S.
law in a way that triggers the U.S. government's reciprocal obligations.
However, even where an individual does not seem to evidence these
two indicators of membership, courts will need to evaluate whether
denying rights will threaten the character of U.S. society.
The decline of territoriality poses some setbacks to advocates of
immigrant rights. Territoriality's decline threatens to destabilize the
historically equal treatment of all individuals, including unauthorized
immigrants, within the U.S. territory. I sympathize with this concern:
territoriality forms the basis of U.S. alienage law, a body of law that is
characterized by marked inclusiveness. However, because the emerging
138.
139.

Id.

Id. at 2252.
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post-territorial model values the very same principles that underlie
territoriality, it should lead to the same inclusive results in virtually
every instance.
Of course, the full development of this post-territorial model is still
ahead, and it is especially important that alienage law scholars continue
to explore the theoretical underpinnings of territoriality to help guide
territoriality's transformation. Otherwise, territoriality may leave
behind a void that courts may fill with the status-based model, which is
exactly what has occurred in the realm of employment law.
III. TERRITORIALITY'S DEMISE IN THE EMPLOYMENT SPHERE: WHERE
WORK AND BORDERS COLLIDE

At first glance, territoriality's role in the employment sphere
appears unremarkable in light of territoriality's broader decline. As
with the distribution of fundamental constitutional rights, territoriality
has taken a progressively more limited role in the distribution of
employment rights and benefits. However, in the employment sphere,
territoriality is giving way to the status-based membership model rather
than to the developing post-territorial model discussed above. Courts
are increasingly relying on status, rather than indicators of de facto
membership, to determine what rights and benefits should be afforded
to workers. The status-based model's encroachment into the
employment sphere represents a convergence of two separate spheres of
membership in which lack of membership in one sphere-the
immigration and border control sphere-dictates the distribution of
membership rights in another-the employment sphere. I argue that, as
posited by Michael Walzer, the immigration sphere should remain a
separate sphere of distribution from internal spheres of distribution. I
further argue that the employment sphere is particularly suited to
application of the emerging post-territorial membership model because
workers, whether documented or not, display all of the fundamental
indicators of membership highlighted in Plyler, Verdugo-Urquidez, and
other membership cases.
In this Part, I begin by tracing the historical role of territoriality in
U.S. employment law. I describe the steady encroachment of the statusbased model, focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
Hoffman and its acceleration of territoriality's demise in the
employment sphere. Next, I address the problems created by the statusbased model's increasing role in the distribution of employment rights
and benefits, arguing that courts' adoption of the status based model in
the employment sphere improperly merges two unrelated spheres of
membership. Specifically, I argue that status is not an adequate
membership model in the employment sphere because it does not take
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into account the fundamental indicators of membership according to
which non-immigration-related rights and benefits have historically
been distributed. Finally, I argue that undocumented workers are
entitled to the same protections as their authorized counterparts by
virtue of their membership in the employment sphere, regardless of
their non-membership in the immigration sphere.
A. The Undocumented Worker: Life on the Borderof Inclusion and
Exclusion
For the authorized immigrant worker, the membership model
governing the distribution of membership rights in the workplace is
inconsequential. The authorized worker holds two trump cards: she is
both authorized to live and work in the United States and she is present
within U.S. borders. Regardless of the model employed, she is entitled
to membership rights and benefits. For the undocumented worker,
though, the membership approach employed matters a great deal. A
strict territorial approach would grant her the same rights that
documented immigrants have, while a status-based approach would
afford minimal or no rights.
In the realm of employment law, no single model consistently
governs the distribution of membership rights for undocumented
immigrants. On the one hand, the undocumented worker's territorial
presence ostensibly secures her all the same workplace protections to
which documented workers are entitled. On the other hand, her
undocumented status often limits, and in some cases eliminates, the
remedies available for employment law violations. Thus, for the
undocumented worker, the workplace lies on the border between
inclusion and exclusion, rights and no rights, where territoriality and
the status-based membership model conflict but coexist.
This disjointed view of undocumented worker membership has
developed over the last several decades." The passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)14 1 gave immigration
status a greater role in the workplace itself.142 However, as I argue
below, it was the U.S. Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Hoffman
Plasdc Compounds v. NLRB"4 3 that definitively opened the door to the
140. For a comprehensive discussion of the interaction between immigration
law and employment law prior to the enactment of IRCA, see Bosniak, Exclusion,
supranote 22.
141. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
142. See id. (barring the employment of undocumented immigrants and
prohibiting the use of fraudulent documents to obtain employment).
143. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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encroachment, and potentially the dominance, of the status-based
membership model in employment-related litigation.
1. FROM TERRITORIALITY TO A STATUS-BASED CONCEPTION OF
MEMBERSHIP

Prior to 1986, U.S. immigration law demonstrated, "at best,
evidence of a peripheral concern with employment of illegal
entrants."'" There was no provision prohibiting the employment of
unauthorized workers.145 In fact, while the concealment, harboring, or
shielding from protection of an undocumented immigrant was illegal,
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) specifically excluded the
employment of an undocumented immigrant from the definition of those
terms.'4
In 1986, Congress enacted IRCA,' 47 which the Supreme Court
would later rely on as a basis for rejecting a strictly territorial approach
to the distribution of employment-related rights.'" In passing IRCA,
Congress sought to neutralize the main incentive for unauthorized
immigration: "as long as job opportunities are available to
undocumented aliens, the intense pressure to surreptitiously enter this
country or to violate status once admitted as a nonimmigrant in order to
obtain employment will continue."" IRCA therefore imposes civil and
criminal penalties on employers who knowingly hire or continue to
employ unauthorized workersso and makes it a crime for an
unauthorized worker to obtain work in the United States using
fraudulent documents.' Notably, IRCA does not impose penalties on
undocumented immigrants who obtain employment in the U.S. without
fraud. The employer, in that situation, bore the burden of the penalty.
Indeed, it was the employer sanctions that promised to be the most
useful in curtailing unauthorized immigration:

144. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976).
145. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892-93 (1984) ("For
whatever reason, Congress has not adopted provisions in the INA making it unlawful
for an employer to hire an alien who is present or working in the United States without
appropriate authorization.").
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3) (2006); Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892-93.
147. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
148. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151.
149. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 56 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5660.
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (2006); § 1324a(e)(4)(A), (f)(1) (2006).
151. Id. § 1324c(a) (2006).
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[t]he principal means of closing the back door, or curtailing
future illegal immigration, is through employer sanctions....
Employers will be deterred by the penalties in this legislation
from hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter
aliens from entering illegally or violating their status . . . .152
Despite Congress's clear focus on the employers of undocumented
workers, rather than the workers themselves, IRCA served as the
catalyst for the rapid encroachment of a status-based model into the
employment sphere under which undocumented workers would be
effectively denied some employment rights.' Although most courts
continued to hold that employment protections technically applied to
undocumented workers, they hesitated to enforce those protections by
awarding back pay.154 The gap between an undocumented worker's
nominal legal rights and the available remedies for a breach of those
rights culminated in the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Hoffman.'s
The petitioner in Hoffman, Castro, had been fired from his job at
the Hoffman chemical plant after Castro had engaged in unionorganizing efforts,"s' an activity protected by the NLRA. 5 1 Castro filed
a claim before the NLRB for back pay and reinstatement." 8 However,
during the resolution of his claim, Castro admitted he was not
authorized to work in the United States and that he had fraudulently

152. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650.
153. See Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1123 (7th Cir.
1992).
154. Id. at 1116-17, 1123. The NLRB continued to struggle with the issue of
back pay for some time, finally deciding in 1995 that the undocumented worker in
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc. could receive back pay from the date of
discharge until he obtained authorization to work in the U.S. or until a reasonable time
to secure those documents had passed. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320
N.L.R.B. 408, 408 (1995). The Second Circuit affirmed the NLRB's decision, noting
that the policies underlying the NLRA had not been altered by the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act. NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group,
Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1997). For a pre-Holfinan description and analysis of
undocumented workers' access to remedies for employment law violations, see Lori A.
Nessel, UndocumentedImnigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Potecdon
and the Need for Reform, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 345 (2001) (calling for full
remedies for undocumented victims of employment law violations and suggesting the
grant of temporary work authorization to victims).
155. Hoffman Plasdc Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2001).
156. Id.
157. The NLRA prohibits discrimination "in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006).
158. Hoffman, 525 U.S. at 140-41.
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obtained a Social Security card to secure employment."5 The NLRB
ultimately ordered Hoffman to compensate Castro for the work Castro
would have performed from the time of his termination to the date that
Hoffman learned of Castro's undocumented status."
Although the Supreme Court did not deny that Castro was indeed
technically protected by the NLRA,' 6' it rejected the Board's attempt to
reconcile an award of back pay with Castro's undocumented status:
"The Board asks that we . . . allow it to award back pay to an illegal

alien for years of work not performed, for wages that could not
lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the first instance
by a criminal fraud."" The Court reasoned that awarding back pay
would run counter to IRCA's underlying policy of "combating the
employment of illegal aliens."16 With the back pay award eliminated,
Castro's only remedy (and Hoffman's only sanction) was the Board's
order that Hoffman cease and desist from engaging in violations of the
NLRA and that Hoffman post a notice of the Board's order at the
plant.1sa
Justice Breyer's dissent took issue with the majority's finding that
an award of back pay would conflict with the policies underlying
IRCA." Rather, the dissent explained, the denial of back pay might
undercut Congress's efforts by incentivizing employers to hire

159. Id. at 141.
160. Id. at 141-42.
161. Id. at 142-43. The question of whether an undocumented employee was
protected under the NLRA had been unambiguously decided in Sure-Tan Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984). There, the Supreme Court employed a territorial
conception of employment rights bolstered by a community preservation rationale.
According to the Court, failure to afford employment rights to the undocumented would
negatively affect working conditions for all employees: "[A]cceptance by illegal aliens
of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress
wage scales and working conditions of cidzens and legally admittedaliens." Id. at 892
(quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976)) (emphasis added).
Ultimately, the Court in Sure-Tan denied back pay to the claimants. Id. at 904-05.
Subsequent lower court opinions differed on the Supreme Court's rationale for denying
back pay, with some arguing that back pay was unavailable merely because the
claimants had already left the boundaries of the United States to return to their home
country. See, e.g., Rios v. Enter. Ass'n Steamfitters Local Union 638 of UA., 860
F.2d 1168, 1173 (2d Cir. 1988); Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391,
1193 (9th Cir. 1986). Others interpreted the Supreme Court's holding to categorically
render undocumented immigrants ineligible for back pay. See, e.g., Del Rey
Tortilleia,Inc. v. NLR, 976 F.2d 1115, 1119 (7th Cir. 1992); Local 512, Warehouse
& Office Workers' Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 725 (9th Cir. 1986).
162. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148-49.
163. Id. at 147, 149.
164. Id. at 152.
165. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (5-4 decision).
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undocumented workers.'" The majority's holding, Justice Breyer
argued, would lower the cost to the employer of labor law violations
thereby making
committed against undocumented workers,
undocumented workers comparatively low-cost employees. 67 Placing
the burden of unauthorized employment on Castro was clearly a
departure from IRCA's intended focus on employer responsibility
rather than employee responsibility.
The Hoffman majority opinion highlights the duality of the
undocumented worker's position in the workplace. By holding that
undocumented workers are "employees" covered under the NLRA,'6
the Supreme Court offered a measure of inclusion and membership to
Castro and all undocumented workers. However, Castro's membership
ended there. Castro's status as an undocumented immigrant foreclosed
reinstatement and back pay."
2. THE HOFFMANEFFECT: NO-MAN'S-LAND AND BEYOND

Hoffman added a new dimension to employment law litigation.
Employers have wielded Hoffman to pry into claimants' immigration
status, aiming to reduce the potential remedy awarded or, at worst,
hoping to intimidate undocumented workers from continuing
litigation.17 o Employees who dare maintain their claims have faced
employers' arguments that Hoffman left undocumented workers with
few, if any, rights."' While Hoffman has not been the magic shield
166. Id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 155-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (at the very least, it encouraged
employers to "take risks, i.e., to hire with a wink and a nod those potentially unlawful
aliens whose unlawful employment . . . ultimately will lower the costs of labor law

violations").
168. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006); Sure-Tan,
Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984).
169. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148-49. But see NLRB v. C & C Roofing Supply,
Inc., 569 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) (allowed voluntary settlement to encompass
lost wages in the form of liquidated damages, stating that this practice would not be in
conflict with IRCA).
170. See Rivera v. NLCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2004)
(discovery of immigration status was not permitted in determining liability but would be
permissible in determining damages); Perez-Fariasv. Global Horizons, Inc., No. CV05-3061-MWL, 2007 WL 1412796, at *3 (E.D. Wash. May 10, 2007) (protective
order granted barring defendants questioning plaintiffs as to immigration status but
evidence and independent investigation into immigration status was permissible);
Romero-Hernandez v. Alexander, No. 3:08CV93-M-A, 2009 WL 1809484, at *6
(N.D. Miss. June 24, 2009); Romero v. CaliforniaHghway Patrol, No. C05-03014
MJJ, 2007 WL 518987, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2007).
171. See, e.g., King v. ZirMed, Inc., No. 3:05CV-181-H, 2007 WL 3306100,
at *5 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 2007) (employer claimed that because IRCA makes the
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employers had hoped it would be, it has vastly altered the employment
law landscape. Immigration status has now become a relevant factor in
the distribution of employment rights.7 2 Beyond foreclosing back pay
and reinstatement in NLRA cases, courts have relied on Hoffman to
limit the remedies available and sometimes eliminate all remedies in
cases based on the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 1 in Title VII
discrimination and harassment claims,174 in cases based on violations of
state employment and tort law,' 75 and in workers' compensation
claims. 7 1 Perhaps signaling a more extensive encroachment of the
status-based model into areas of law traditionally governed by the
territorial model, immigration status has seeped into tort law litigation,
with defendants claiming that an undocumented immigrant cannot be
awarded compensatory damages for lost wages.' 77

employment of undocumented immigrants illegal, employment contracts entered into by
an undocumented immigrant are unenforceable).
172. See, e.g., Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., No. 02 C 495, 2003 WL
21995190, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2003).
173. Id. But see Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464-65 (E.D.N.Y.
2002).
174. See, e.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D.
Tex. 2003) (dismissing claimant's claims for back pay under Title VII because "such a
remedy [is] foreclosed by the fact that he was an undocumented worker at the time he
was employed").
175. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d
504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that, under state tort law, "alien status is relevant
to determining whether lost earnings are appropriate and, if so, how much should be
awarded" but reserving for jury the ultimate questions of whether claimant would have
nonetheless obtained employment in the United States and what wages he would have
earned); Hemandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. 01-1241-JTM, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19780, at *16-19 (D. Kan. 2003) (in negligence claim, agreeing with defendants'
concession that "plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the persons responsible for the
physical injuries they sustain and for any impact on their ability to generate income in
their country of ongin") (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added); Rosa v.
Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1002 (N.H. 2005) ("Generally, an illegal
alien may not recover lost United States earnings."); Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841
A.2d 471, 472-73, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (explaining that
undocumented immigrant plaintiff making claim under New Jersey anti-discrimination
law for illegal termination is barred from compensation: "it is the illegality of plaintiffs
employment which precludes both economic and non-economic damages"); Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tex. App. 2003).
176. Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510, 520-21 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003), leave to appealgranted, 671 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. 2003), order grantng leave to
4ppeal vacated, 684 N.W.2d 342 (Mich. 2004); Xiic v. Quick, 69 Va. Cir. 295, 296
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
177. Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1322 (M.D.
Fla. 2003).
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a. FairLaborStandardsAct
Hoffman has secured the status-based model a role in claims
arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act. As with cases brought
under the NLRA, Hoffman has been interpreted to eliminate back pay
and reinstatement as available remedies for an undocumented worker's
successful FLSA claim.' 78 In Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., 79 for
example, the Northern District of Illinois held that back pay and front
pay (compensation for work that the employee, once reinstated, will
perform in the future) were not available to an undocumented worker
who had filed a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act.' 80 However,
courts have uniformly declined to interpret Hoffman to foreclose a
claimant from receiving payment for work already performed.' In
Flores v. Ani'gon,a2 for example, the court granted a protective order
precluding discovery of the plaintiff's immigration status in his claim
for compensation for work already performed, holding that Hoffman
did not apply to those circumstances.' 83
b. Title Vf
Hoffman's effect on discrimination suits under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964' has varied, with some courts suggesting that
a purely territorial approach, where the claimant's status is irrelevant,
should apply.'" In Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc.,18 the Ninth Circuit, without
deciding the issue, suggested that Hoffman was not applicable to Title
VII claims." There, twenty-three Latina and Southeast Asian
immigrants with limited English proficiency challenged their
employer's use of "basic job skills examinations," claiming that the

178. See Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., No. 02 C 495, 2003 WL 21995190, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2003).
179. Id.
180. Id. at *6.
181. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 325 (D.N.J.
2005); Liu v. Donna Kauan Int', Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Flores v.Albertsons, Inc., No. CV0100515AHM, 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
182. 233 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
183. Id. at 464-65; see also Liu, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Flores, 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 ("Hoffman did not hold that an undocumented
employee was barred from recovering unpaid wages for work actually performed.").
184. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e-17 (2006)).
185. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2004).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1074-75, cart. denied, 544 U.S. 905 (2005).
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exams had a disparate impact on them because of their national
origin.'" After being asked about their immigration status during a
deposition, the plaintiffs sought a protective order precluding further
discovery of the plaintiffs' immigration status, which was granted.'
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the order: "We seriously doubt that
Hoffman is as broadly applicable as [the employer] contends, and
specifically believe it unlikely that it applies in Title VII cases.""
According to the court, Title VII's reliance on private causes of action
for enforcement, inclusion of full compensatory and punitive damages
as available remedies, and its administration by federal courts instead of
administrative agencies distinguished Title VII from the NLRA. 1 In
addition, the court noted that it
is the reasonably certain prospect of a back pay award that
provide(s) the spur or catalyst which causes employers and
unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the
last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this
country's history.'"
In other words, the court expressed concern that excluding
undocumented immigrants from any Title VII remedies might erode
working conditions for everyone-this is a classic self-preservation
argument.
Other courts, however, have disagreed with Rivera and have
extended the Hoffman rationale to Title VII claims. In Escobar v.
Spartan Security Service,in the Southern District of Texas granted in
part an employer's motion for summary judgment in a Title VII
claim.'" The court held that back pay was not available to a claimant
who had been undocumented at the time of the sexual harassment,
sexual discrimination, and retaliation alleged in his complaint but who

188. Id. at 1061.
189. Id. at 1061-62.
190. Id. at 1067.
191. Id. at 1067-68.
192. Id. at 1069 (quoting Albemarle PaperCo. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 41718 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. 281 F. Supp. 2d 895 (S.D. Tex. 2003). See also De La Rosa v. N.
Harvest Fmit, 210 F.R.D. 237, 239 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (denying motion to compel
discovery of Title Vll claimant's immigration status while employed or after the
employer's voluntary offer of reinstatement: "The only period for which immigration
status might potentially be relevant is the period from [the unlawful termination until
the employer's voluntary offer of reinstatement]").
194. Escobar,281 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
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had since gained authorization to work legally in the U.S.195 However,
the court suggested that other remedies, including reinstatement and
front pay, might be available to the claimant.'"
c. State employment la w and tort cases
Not only has the Hoffman endorsement of the status-based
approach altered the nature of federal employment law litigation, but it
has also seeped into state tort and employment law. A federal district
court in Florida held that the estate of an employee injured in a forklift
accident could not recover lost U.S. wages in its claim against the
forklift manufacturer and lessor.'9 Citing Hoffman, the court reasoned
that lost wage compensation was sufficiently like the back pay denied in
Hoffman for the court to find that immigration status precluded its
award to an undocumented worker: "Awarding lost wages is akin to
compensating an employee for work to be performed. This Court
cannot sanction such a result."' 98
A New Jersey court affirmed summary judgment in favor of an
employer who had fired an undocumented worker during the worker's
maternity leave in violation of state employment law because "she just
had a baby and people like her are irresponsible."'9 Relying on
Hoffman and the similarities between the state law at issue and the
NLRA, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs lack of authorization to
work precluded both economic and non-economic damages for her
termination. 2' Several courts have instead suggested that undocumented
immigrants may only recover lost wages based on the prevailing wage
in the immigrant's home country. 20'
195. Id. at 897.
196. Id. ("As for the other remedies available under Title VII, including
reinstatement and front pay, there is no authority cited by Spartan which directly
addresses the availability of such remedies for an individual who was an undocumented
worker at the time he was employed by the defendant, but who, following his
termination, obtained legal work status in the United States.").
197.
Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1336-37 (M.D.
Fla. 2003).
198. Id. at 1336.
199. Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 473 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004).
200. Id. at 476-77.
201. See, e.g., Hemandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. 01-1241-JITM, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19780 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003) (declining to bar undocumented
immigrants from recovering future lost wages in negligence claim, but suggesting that
their status may allow them to recover only "for any impact on their ability to generate
income in their country of origin"); Rosa v. Partersin Progress,Inc., 868 A.2d 994,
1002 (N.H. 2005) (finding undocumented status relevant where an "illegal alien
wish[es] to pursue a claim for lost earning capacity measured at United States wage
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The Southern District of New York interpreted Hoffman to have a
less restrictive effect on state law claims in Madeira v. Affordable
Housing Foundadon.202 It held that undocumented status does not
prevent a worker from recovering compensatory damages for
employers' employment law violations.203 It held that status was merely
relevant to the amount of lost earnings that could be awarded, but noted
that "the fact is, undocumented aliens do obtain work in the United
States."' Other courts have rejected the notion that Hoffman has any
bearing on state civil law claims and have allowed workers to recover
lost wages they would have earned. 205
d. Workers' compensation
Hoffman's effect on state workers' compensation cases has been
mixed. While a few courts have denied undocumented workers access
to all benefits, most have held that undocumented workers are entitled
to at least some benefits.' In what is likely the most expansive view of
Hoffman, a Virginia court ordered a workers' compensation claimant to
respond to the employer's discovery request regarding immigration
status.20 Citing Hoffman, the court held that the claimant's immigration
levels") (emphasis added). In Sanango v. 200 East 16th Street Housing Corp., 788
N.Y.S. 2d 314 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004), the court concluded "that state tort law, to the
extent it permits an undocumented alien to recover compensation for lost illegal wages
as an element of damages, is preempted by IRCA pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution. We are unaware, however, of any federal policy that
would be offended by awarding an undocumented alien damages for lost earnings based
on the prevailing wage in the alien's country of origin." See id. at 321. However, the
New York's highest court later abrogated that holding in Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC,
6 N.Y.S. 3d 338 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
202. 315 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tex.
App. 2004).
206. See, e.g., Pontes v. New EnglandPower Co., No. 0300160A, 2004 WL
2075458, at *3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 19, 2004) (denying motion to compel discovery of
claimant's immigration status in workers' compensation case because status is not
relevant); Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy, Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)
(limiting collection of lost wages to time period during which employer did not know of
employee's undocumented status), leave to appeal granted, 671 N.W.2d 874 (Mich.
2003), order granting leave to appeal vacated, 684 N.W.2d 342 (Mich. 2004);
Cherokee Indus. v. Alvarez, 84 P.3d 798 (Okla. Ct. App. 2003) (undocumented status
does not foreclose alien from workers' compensation benefits but may render alien
ineligible for specific remedy of vocation rehabilitation or medical treatment by a
specific doctor); Xinic v. Quick, 69 Va. Cir. 295, 2005 WL 3789231 (Va. Cir. Ct.
2005) (stating that an undocumented alien cannot bring workers' compensation claim in
Virginia).
207. Xinic, 69 Va. Cir. 295, 2005 WL 3789231.
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status was relevant, not merely to the remedies available, but to the
claimant's qualification to bring suit at all: "Essentially, Plaintiffs
argument that he is entitled to make a workers' compensation claim,
even if he is an illegal alien, is 'foreclosed by federal immigration
policy. . . ."208 In this case, the court employed a status-based
approach to both the question of remedies and the question of coverage.
Some courts have not discarded the territorial model in its entirety
when it comes to workers' compensation. In Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy,'
the Michigan Court of Appeals relied on Hoffman to hold that an
undocumented immigrant, while an "employee" under the state
workers' compensation statute, was not entitled to wage-loss benefits
once the employer had discovered the claimant's undocumented
status. 210 The court reasoned that the claimant's fraudulent use of false
documents constituted a crime that prevented him from working."
Since Michigan law mandated suspension of wage-loss benefits for any
period during which an individual could not work because of his
commission of a crime, the claimant was not entitled to wage-loss
benefits for any time after which his employer discovered his
immigration status.212
Many courts have held that immigration status is completely
irrelevant to workers' compensation claims.2 13 The Supreme Court of
Minnesota went so far as to hold that an undocumented immigrant
could recover temporary total disability compensation even where the
applicable statute conditioned such compensation on the worker

208. Id. at *1. The court was unhindered by the relevant workers'
compensation statute, which defined an "employee" as "[e]very person, including
aliens and minors, in the service of another under any contract of hire ... whether
lawfully or unlawfully employed. . . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (2007) (emphasis
added).
209. 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003), leave to appeal granted, 671
N.W.2d 874 (Mich. 2003), ordergranting leave to appeal vacated, 684 N.W.2d 342
(Mich. 2004).
210. Id. at 515, 518-19.
211. Id. at 521.
212. Id. Courts also often deny vocational rehabilitation on the grounds that an
unauthorized worker has no legal right to a vocation in the United States. See De Jesus
Uibe v. Aviles, No. B166839, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9698, at *13 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 26, 2004) (finding undocumented workers ineligible for vocational
rehabilitation because such workers cannot legally resume work within the United
States); Cherokee Indus. v. Alvarez, 84 P.3d 798, 801 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003)
(suggesting that undocumented workers may be ineligible for vocational rehabilitation).
213. See, e.g., Pontes v. New England Power Co., No. 0300160A, 2004 WL
2075458, at *3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 19, 2004) (denying motion to compel discovery of
claimant's immigration status in workers' compensation case).
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engaging in a diligent job search.214 The court rejected the argument
that Hoffman required the court to determine that someone without
authorization to work in the U.S. could not, by definition, perform a
diligent job search.2 15
B. FracturedMembership
The fractured view of membership widely applied to the
distribution of employment rights and benefits creates significant
concerns on three levels. It leads to inconsistency and unpredictability,
undermines immigration policy, and causes the convergence of the
employment and immigration spheres in violation of Walzer's concept
of complex equality.
1. INCONSISTENCY AND UNPREDICTABILITY

On a practical level, the current approach to the distribution of
employment-related rights and benefits is inconsistent. Not only does
the virtual lack of remedies completely undermine the supposed
protection of undocumented workers, but it is inconsistent across
jurisdictions and types of cases. While undocumented status forecloses
back pay under the NLRA, it may be irrelevant for the award of lost
wages under Title VII. One state may allow an undocumented worker
to collect workers' compensation benefits, but another may exclude
them altogether.
2. REVERSE INCENTIVES
Of course, abandoning territoriality and espousing a status-based
model that fully excludes unauthorized workers from employment law
protections would solve these practical problems. Such a scheme would
be internally consistent and easily applied across jurisdictions and
statutory schemes. Unauthorized workers would not be members at all,
either nominally or by virtue of the enjoyment of rights, for all
employment and labor law purposes. This solution even makes some
intuitive sense on a policy level. After all, if unauthorized immigrants
come to the U.S. for jobs, then making those jobs unappealing should
reduce the flow of unauthorized immigration.
This logic, however, ignores the deplorable working conditions
and minimal wages of the developing countries that supply the vast
214.
2003).
215.

Corma v. Waymouth Fanns, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 329-30 (Minn.
Id. at 330-31.
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majority of unauthorized immigrants to the U.S. 216 For many potential
unauthorized immigrants, the absence of enforced labor protections is
the status quo in their countries of origin,217 and the impossibility of
securing basic goods and services on the average salary in the
developing world is enough to motivate unauthorized migration into the
United States, where even wages well below minimum-wage
requirements provide a substantially higher standard of living.' In
fact, many unauthorized immigrants continue to migrate to the U.S. and
remain here despite the severe abuses of unscrupulous employers who
threaten revealing their unauthorized workers' status should they report
their employer's violations of law. It is hard to imagine the extent to
which working conditions and wages would have to deteriorate in order
to neutralize the incentive for unauthorized immigration. Not only
would such an effort be unpalatable, but it would be virtually
impossible, and merely removing workplace protections (and thereby
legalizing what some employers already do) would certainly be
insufficient to significantly change the incentive structure. 219
Rather, as courts and commentators have argued, 2 it is likely that
exclusion of unauthorized immigrants from labor protections would
216. See Brandie Ballard Wade, CAFTA-DR Labor Provisions: Why They Fail
Workers and Provide Dangerous Precedentfor the FTAA, 13 LAW & Bus. REv. AM.
645, 658-66 (2007) (comparing working conditions and wages of several signatories to
the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement).
217. Id. at 649. See also Elizabeth Goergen, Women Workers in Mexico:
Using the InternationalHuman Rights Framework to Achieve Labor Protection, 39
GEo. J. INT'L L. 401, 407-08 (2008) (calling for the enforcement of international
human rights standards to remedy the Mexican government's failure to protect women
from the sexual harassment and other sexual discrimination that runs rampant in the
Mexican workplace); Stephen Zamora, A Proposed North American Regional
Development Fund: The Next Phase of North American Integration Under NAFTA, 40
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 93, 110, 116 (2008) (highlighting the wage disparity between the
U.S. and Mexico, with the U.S. per capita income being six times higher than that of
Mexico and approximately 20 million Mexicans living on less than $2.00 a day).
218. See Wade, supranote 216, at 649 (stating that "[t]he Mexican government
approximated that more than half of the population makes less than the amount
necessary to cover basic needs such as food, housing, and health care"); Zamora, supra
note 217, at 118 (stating that "[p]overty in Mexico is the root cause of Mexican
migration to the United States"). See also UNDERGROUND AMERICA, NARRATIVES OF
UNDOCUMENTED LIvEs (Peter Omer ed., 2008) (a collection of narratives from

undocumented workers recounting the reasons they have come to the United States and
their struggle to survive despite deplorable working conditions).
219. See Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized
Inmigrants: The ExperimentFals, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 211-13 (2007).
220. See, e.g., Connie de la Vega & Conchita Lozano-Batista, Advocates
Should Use Applicable InternationalStandardsto Addess Violations of Undocumented
Migrant Workers' Rights in the United States, 3 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 35,
48 (2005); O'Donovan, supra note 9, at 299-300, 302, 331; Maria Pab6n L6pez, The
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instead create incentives for employers to continue hiring unauthorized
workers-the very problem that Congress sought to address with IRCA.
First, removing back pay as an available remedy for the violation of
any employee's employment rights severely undercuts one of the main
purposes of the NLRA and other labor law: to discourage employers
from violating labor laws." Without back pay, the NLRB is left with
remedies that have no deterrent effect at all.2" The remedies approved
by the majority in Hoffman-an order that the employer cease and
desist its illegal conduct and post a notice to employees of the NLRA
violation-are a small price to pay for improper termination of an
employee. With no remedy to enforce an ostensibly legally ensured
right, employees will have little incentive to report their employers'
labor-law violations-an incentive easily extinguished by their
employers' threats to expose undocumented workers' legal status during
litigation." As a result, undocumented workers will have little option
but to continue working under substandard conditions.224
This, in turn, encourages continued hiring of undocumented
workers, a practice specifically prohibited by IRCA and ostensibly the
very focus of IRCA. 225 The denial of back pay "lowers the cost to the
employer of an initial labor law violation .

. .

. It thereby increases the

employer's incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien employees" 22 6 or at
least encourages employers to hire "with a wink and a nod those
potentially unlawful aliens whose unlawful employment (given the
Court's views) ultimately will lower the costs of labor law

violations." 227
Place of the Undocumented Worker in the United States Legal System After Hoffman
Plastic Compounds: An Assessment and Comparison With Argentina's Legal System,
15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 301, 302, 319 (2005).
221. Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc., v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 153-54
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. See, e.g., Nancy Cleeland, Employers Test Ruling on Imigrant Worker
Rights, ASHEViLLE GLOBAL REP., Apr. 22, 2002, http://www.theglobalreport.org/
issues/171/labor.html (reporting that the attorney of a New York meat market accused
of violating minimum wage laws wrote to an advocacy group intending to demonstrate
in front of the business, "I am sure you are aware of the ruling by the Supreme Court
of the United States that illegal immigrants do not have the same rights as US
citizens").
224. Richard A. Johnson, Twenty Years of IRCA: The Urgent Need for an
Updated Legislative Response to the Current UndocumentedImigrantSituation in the
United States, 21 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 239, 265 (2007) (cataloguing statistical evidence of
the abuse and mistreatment of undocumented workers).
225. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650.
226. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155.
227. Id. at 155-56.
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In addition, the reverse incentives created by the failure to afford
equal remedies to undocumented immigrants erode workplace standards
for all employees, especially where undocumented workers compose a
high percentage of the workforce. Where undocumented workers are
readily available and easily coerced into remaining quiet about labor
law violations, documented workers, too, will be reluctant to report
those violations out of a fear of being replaced by an undocumented
worker or as a result of pressure from undocumented co-workers who
do not want to risk exposure of immigration status. Statistics suggest
this dynamic may indeed be present: industries in which undocumented
workers compose a high percentage of employees (which are often the
most dangerous and lowest paying industries) exhibit a high incidence
of wage and hour law violations. 228
3. COLLISION OF SPHERES
Aside from creating an incentive structure that undermines both
immigration and employment law, the encroachment of the status-based
model into the employment sphere represents a convergence of two
different spheres of membership. For the undocumented worker, a
good distributed in the sphere of immigration law-formal statusdictates, for all practical purposes, access to a good distributed in
another, internal sphere of distribution. In Hoffman, for example,
status foreclosed back pay, the primary enforcement mechanism
provided to secure an employee's right to participate in unionorganizing activities.2 Under Walzer's scheme of complex equality,
this is permissible only if status has an intrinsic connection to labor and
employment rights.3
a. Immigradon andemployment, disentangled
Admittedly, IRCA's explicit prohibition on the employment of an
undocumented immigrant evidences at least Congress's collective
opinion that employment and immigration are, to some extent,
228. See Rebecca Smith et al., Low Pay, Higb Risk: State Models Advancing
Imnigrant Workers' Rights, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 597, 600 (2004)
(reporting on U.S. Department of Labor surveys showing that "in 2000, 100% of all
poultry processing plants were noncompliant with federal wage and hour laws; in 2001
almost half of all garment-manufacturing businesses in New York City failed to comply
with Fair Labor Standards Act . . . overtime provisions; and in 1999 agricultural

employers engaged in cucumber, lettuce, and onion harvesting had unacceptably low
levels of compliance with FLSA and other worker protections").
229. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147, 149.
230. WALZER, supra note 16, at 19.
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related, 21 and popular opinion certainly reflects the belief that
undocumented immigrants cross U.S. borders to take jobs that belong
to authorized workers. 23 2 In fact, IRCA's very purpose was to relieve
"the intense pressure to surreptitiously enter this country or violate
status once admitted as a nonimmigrant in order to obtain
employment. "
However, the fact that employment in the U.S. serves as an
incentive for undocumented immigrants does not necessarily dictate that
documented status be a prerequisite for the enforcement of employment
rights. If such a relationship were sufficient, U.S. law might deny the
unauthorized immigrant medical assistance, educational opportunities,
the right to marry, or any other benefit that could induce unauthorized
migration. The relationship must be stronger. The question we ought to
be asking is whether a lack of authorized status fairly indicates an
individual's eligibility for membership-characterized by the enjoyment
of rights-in the sphere of employment. 2' Does our conception of
employment-related rights-the right to participate in union-organizing
activities, collect a fair wage, and work in a discrimination-free
environment, for example-turn on formal admission into the territory?
Arguably, Congress and many courts have already answered this
question in the negative despite the growing convergence of the
employment and immigration spheres. IRCA itself evidences a strong
separation between the employment and immigration spheres. While
IRCA penalizes an employer for hiring an undocumented immigrant,235
IRCA is notably silent on the undocumented immigrant's acceptance of
such employment."' Absent fraud, IRCA simply does not penalize an
undocumented immigrant's acceptance of employment absent fraud.
Nowhere does IRCA exclude undocumented immigrants from federal
labor and employment law protections as a result of unauthorized
employment. Nowhere does IRCA strip undocumented workers of
231. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5650; H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5757-58.
232. But see ALEJANDRo PORTES & RUBEN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA:
A PORTRAIT 15-16 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing a variety of motivations for immigration
and challenging the presumption that "desperate poverty, squalor, and unemployment"
are the driving force of immigration).
233. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 45-46, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5650.
234. WALZER, supra note 16, at 22 (stating that "[no social good x should be
distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely because the
possess y and without regard to the meaning of x").
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)-(5), (f) (2006).
236. O'Donovan, supranote 9, at 303; Wishnie, supra note 219, at 204.
237. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (2006).
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employment rights by virtue of status. Rather, the statute provides very
specific criminal penalties for employers and employees who violate its
provisions.23
IRCA's legislative history strengthens the separation between the
employment and immigration spheres. The House Judiciary Committee
Report was fairly explicit in its separation of immigration law from
employment law:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer
sanctions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or
diminish in any way laborprotecdonsin existing law ... . In
particular, the employer sanctions provisions are not intended
to limit in any way the scope of the term "employee" in ...
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) .

. . .

[A]pplication

of the NLRA 'helps to assure that the wages and employment
conditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected by
the competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject
to the standard terms of employment.239
Similarly, the House Education and Labor Committee Report opined
that no provision of IRCA,
limit[s] the powers of State or Federal labor standards
agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor, he Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, or Labor
arbitrators .

. to remedy unfair practices committed against
undocumented employees for exercising their rights ... [tjo
.

do otherwise would be counter-productive of our intent to
limit the hiring of undocumented employees and the
depressing effect on working conditions caused by their
employment.

2

238. 18 U.S.C. § 1015(e) (2006); id. § 1546(b) (2006) (providing for a fine
and/or imprisonment of not more than five years for individuals who use or attempt to
use fraudulent documents to obtain employment); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (2006)
(providing for a fine and/or imprisonment of not more than six months for employers
engaging in a pattern or practice of violations).
239. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5757, 5662 (quoting Sure-Tan Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984)) (emphasis
added).
240. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5757, 5758.

866

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Courts, even those that have ultimately foreclosed undocumented
workers from receiving back pay and other remedies, have agreed that
undocumented immigrants are "employees" covered by federal and
state employment laws.241 No federal appeals court has held that
undocumented status converts individuals into nonpersons outside the
reach of the law.242
In effect, there is substantial agreement that undocumented
immigrants are entitled, at least nominally, to labor and employment
protections. This makes sense in light of the different purposes of
employment and immigration law. Immigration law concerns the
nation-state's power to control admission to the U.S. territory. 24 3 This
sphere of distribution exists as a function of the state's power to
deliberately define itself as a community, and so the state's consent
directly relates to the good being distributed: status. 2" The employment
sphere, however, is not driven by the state's power to admit individuals
into the territory. Rather, it is driven by the necessity of protecting
workers from the potential abuses of employers. Just as an individual's
status does not make her an outlaw, her status does not strip her of her
role as an employee.
b. The paradox, demysdfied
It is under-enforcement of employment rights-by limiting access
to remedies-that interferes with the undocumented worker's widely
acknowledge right to employment protections. Given the clear
241. In fact, the Supreme Court itself had specifically held that undocumented
workers were "employees" for purposes of the NLRA. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,
467 U.S. 883, 891-92 (1984) (agreeing with the NLRB's claim that undocumented
aliens are "employees" within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Act). Although Sure-Tan
was decided before the passage of IRCA, the Hoffman Court failed to overrule that
holding and instead limited its opinion to the availability of back pay. See Hoffman
Plasdc Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2001) ("We hold that such
relief is foreclosed by federal immigration policy" (emphasis added)). See also id. at
142-43 (describing the issue as one of remedies for an established violation: "This case
exemplifies the principle that the Board's discretion to select and fashion remedies for
violations of the NLRA, though generally broad, ... is not unlimited" (citations
omitted)).
242. See, e.g., Agri ProcessorCo. Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.
2008) ("The Supreme Court addressed only what remedies the Board may grant
undocumented aliens when employers violate their rights under the NLRA. Nowhere in
Hoffman Plasdc did the Court hold that IRCA leaves undocumented aliens altogether
unprotected by the NLRA."); Del Rey Tordlleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1121
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding "that undocumented aliens are employees within the meaning
of the NLRA," despite IRCA's prohibition on employment of undocumented
immigrants, but declining to award back pay).
243. WALZER, supranote 16, at 31, 33.
244. See id.
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separation between immigration law and employment law espoused by
many courts and by Congress, 245 what accounts for courts' seemingly
schizophrenic denial of remedies based on status? Why do employment
rights often become rights without remedies for undocumented
workers? Hoffman's language suggests that the fractured membership
of the undocumented immigrant is attributable to the difficulty of
reconciling an undocumented immigrant's statutory right to
employment protections with U.S. law's explicit prohibition on hiring
undocumented immigrants. 2" After all, it seems paradoxical to prohibit
the employment of undocumented immigrants but offer every
employee, regardless of undocumented status, the protections and rights
available to authorized employees. Such a scheme appears to reward
individuals for engaging in unauthorized behavior. This tension
between exclusion and inclusion is especially palpable in the context of
back pay, which is based on the assumption that an undocumented
immigrant would have continued unauthorized employment if not for an
employer's illegal termination of employment.247 Awarding back pay to
an undocumented immigrant fulfills her expectation of unauthorized
wages. 2 4
245. See supra Part III.B. See also Kati L. Griffith, A Supreme Switch: The
Supremacy Clause in the Wake of IRCA and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 41 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 127, 134 (2008) (analyzing the effect of IRCA and Hoffman on state labor
and employment laws in terms of federal preemption, and arguing that the remedy of
back pay bears no intrinsic link with immigration law such that IRCA preempts
employment law protections for undocumented workers); Patrick D. Kenneally,
Protecting CourtBorders: Fencing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB Out of
Illinois Civil Courts, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 59, 68, 76 (2007) (emphasizing the
"corrective justice" goal of state tort law as opposed to IRCA's purpose to "deflate the
swell of undocumented immigration"); Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in
Need: Undocumented Workers' Rigts and Remedies Under Tide VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 607, 616 (1994) (arguing that IRCA's emphasis on employer
conduct evidences the diverging purpose of IRCA and Title VII).
246. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 150-51 (noting that
awarding back pay to the victim of an NLRA violation "trivializes the immigration
laws" and "trenchles] upon explicit statutory prohibitions [against the employment of
an undocumented worker] critical to federal immigration policy"). See also Beth Lyon,
T4ping the Balance: Why Courts Should Look to Internationaland Foreign Law on
Unauthorized Imnigrant Worker Rights, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 169, 188-89 (2007)
("The notion of paying people back wages for work they would have been performing
in violation of immigration laws simply seemed too permissive.").
247. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 150 (arguing that an award of
back pay presumes continued illegal presence in the U.S.: "Castro thus qualifies for the
Board's award only by remaining inside the United States illegally").
248. Notably, the Supreme Court's opinion in Plyler assumes that
undocumented children may remain in the U.S. without authorization to do so: "To be
sure, like all persons who have entered the United States unlawfully, these children are
subject to deportation. . . . But there is no assurance that a child subject to deportation
will ever be deported." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982).
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This is the fundamental paradox of territoriality and, more
broadly, of complex equality. Under Walzer's conception of strict
territoriality, the state's right to limit entry into the territory should not
ordinarily preclude distribution of rights within the territory.249 By
stripping this axiom of its geography and applying it more abstractly,
we can postulate that the state's right to limit entry into a particular
sphere of distribution should not ordinarily preclude distribution of
rights within that sphere of distribution. In other words, authorization
to enter a sphere of distribution is a good in and of itself, separate from
the very goods distributed within a sphere. This statement, while
perhaps dissonant in its abstract formulation, is familiar it its practical
application-this is not a new concept in U.S. law.
Child labor law serves as a useful and particularly relevant
example. Like the undocumented worker, children-at least those under
a certain age-lack the authorization to work under various state child
labor provisions. Children, then, are not legally allowed to enter the
employment sphere of distribution. However, once inside the
employment sphere, regardless of how they have entered that sphere of
distribution, children are widely entitled to all the same rights and
benefits that their adult counterparts are entitled to. In fact, several state
statutes provide for additional compensation to child victims of labor
and employment law violations, in part because remedies for violations
of labor and employment law serve as "punishment and deterrence of
employers' illegal conduct." 2so Thus, the illegality of the employment
relationship does not strip the child of her status as an employee. This
remains the case even where the child has fraudulently obtained
employment because "the critical focus is not upon the circumstances
and conduct of the child, but rather upon the conduct of the
employer."251
In Schneider, for example, a New Jersey court rejected an
insurance company's argument that a thirteen-year-old boy who had
lost his arm in a meat grinder was not covered under the employer's
liability policy issued pursuant to state employment law. 2 In American
Belt Company v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board,neither party
249.

WALZER, supranote 16, at 31.

250.

Am. Belt Co. v. Workers' Compensadon Appeal Bd., 755 A.2d 77, 81

(2000).
251. Id. at 82 (directing the lower court to determine whether the employer
knew or should have known that he was hiring an underage worker even though
underage worker had provided fraudulent identification). See also Krutlies v. Bulls
Head Coal Co., 94 A. 459, 460 (Pa. 1915) (awarding damages for a work-related
injury to minor employee that had used fraudulent documents to secure employment).
252. Nat'1 Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 392 A.2d 641, 642, 644 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
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questioned an illegally employed minor's entitlement to workers'
compensation for the injuries she sustained when her arm was caught in
a "knifelike" machine. 25 3 Rather, the issue was whether the employer
was subject to the additional penalty provided by the workers'
compensation statute for hiring an underage worker despite the young
woman's fraud.54
In these cases, the courts' actions can be characterized in terms of
separating spheres of distribution despite the perceived paradox it
creates. A child's lack of entitlement to enter the employment sphere
does not preclude her from enjoying the rights that pertain to that
sphere of distribution once she is in it. While the rationales underlying
child-labor laws are not the same as those underlying IRCA's
prohibition on undocumented immigrants' employment, the child
employment cases serve to illustrate my point: that an employment
relationship, although illegal or unauthorized, is still an employment
relationship.' This is especially true where, as with child-labor laws
and IRCA's prohibition of the employment of undocumented
immigrants, the burden of the illegal employment is intended to be
borne by the employer rather than the employee."
C. Work and Membership
The theoretical separation between immigration law and
employment law does not, by itself, require the distribution of fully
enforceable membership rights to undocumented workers. It merely
precludes distributing employment rights based on status because there
is no intrinsic relationship between status and the rights distributed in

253. Am. Belt Co., 755 A.2d at 78.
254. Id. at 79.
255. For an interesting treatment of the meaning of "employment," see Bruce
Goldstein et al., Enfolrcig FairLaborStandardsin the Modern American Sweatshop.:
Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REv. 983 (1999)
(drawing attention to the development of state child labor laws as evidence of a broader
definition for employment that includes "suffer or permit" to work). See id. at 1030.
See also H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1990), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5757, 5662 ("In particular, the employer sanctions provisions are not intended to limit
in any way the scope of the term 'employee' in ... the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)" (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984)).
256. Compare American Belt Co., 755 A.2d at 82 ("In applying [state child
labor laws], the critical focus is not upon the circumstances and conduct of the child,
but rather upon the conduct of the employer.") with New El Rey Sausage Co. v. INS,
925 F.2d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that IRCA "imposed a major change in
immigration law by placing part of the burden of enforcement on employers" rather
than on the immigrant worker).
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the employment sphere. Thus, the question still remains: which
membership model applies?
As I have explained above, there is a good argument that
immigration status bears little relationship to the ability to enforce
employment rights. Status seems an ill-suited indicator of membership
in the employment sphere. Territoriality also fails as an accurate model
of membership because, as courts arguably are already recognizing, its
results are not consistent with some of its underlying rationales.
Territorial presence no longer operates to reward community ties, as
relationships are less dictated by geographic boundaries than they are
by common interest, familial ties, cultural similarities, and commercial
interests, all of which transcend political borders. Neither can territorial
presence serve to define the limits of a state's power to act and
obligation to protect individuals. States often exert governmental power
outside political boundaries, weakening the argument that a government
only has the power to protect individuals within its territory.
Courts outside of the employment sphere have recognized the
problems with territoriality and have begun to look directly to the
rationales underlying territoriality to sort members from nonmembers. I
propose that the same be done in the employment sphere in order to
more accurately distribute rights according to de facto membership in
the employment sphere itself.
Under the developing post-territorial approach to membership,
undocumented workers, as a category, are members of the employment
sphere entitled to the full distribution of membership rights available in
that sphere. First, undocumented workers have significant affiliations
with their surrounding community. Their employment, alone, ensures
the existence of these ties. Undocumented workers contribute to a
collective effort and add value to an enterprise." Their employers and
the broader economy rely on undocumented workers to perform what
are often undesirable and dangerous tasks that few authorized workers
care to perform.
Second, the principle of mutuality of obligation, particularly as it
appears in Boumediene, which emphasized the relevance of the
257. In fact, for many scholars, work represents much more than community
ties-it represents a commitment to democratic principles and a sense of responsibility
and obligation to the community. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of
Work in ConsdtudonalPerspective, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 523, 529 (1997) (arguing that
"the values of liberty and equality are interwoven essentials of our national union" and
"[b]y understanding some of the relations of work to community, perhaps we can better
appreciate the interdependence of citizens"); Vicki Schultz, Essay, Life's Work, 100
CoLUM. L. REv. 1881, 1886 (2000) (arguing that social justice depends on equal access
to paid work because "work has been fundamental to our conception of the good life. It
has been constitutive of citizenship, community, and even personal identity").
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government's de facto authority over the claimants,2 8 further suggests
that undocumented workers, despite their lack of work authorization,
are members entitled to full membership rights. On one level, the only
law that applies to undocumented workers in the United States is U.S.
law, and the government should not be allowed to impose obligations
upon undocumented immigrants without also affording corresponding
protections. But on a more specific level, the relationship between
employee and employer is one of reciprocal obligations. An employee
subjects herself to the requirements and instructions of an employer on
the assumption that the employee will abide by legally imposed
standards. To allow an employer to circumvent these standards by
denying undocumented immigrants certain remedies is to approve of the
employer's refusal to fulfill its reciprocal obligations to an employee-it
allows employers to govern employees without legal constraint.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the failure to enforce the
rights of the undocumented worker is likely to create a sub-caste of
workers without enforceable rights. Aside from leaving a group of
residents without full legal recourse for blatant violations of
employment rights, this threatens our societal norms of equal rights in
the workplace and ultimately endangers the rights of authorized
workers and citizens. Absent full protection for undocumented workers,
employment standards could be weighed down by the sheer number of
undocumented immigrants working under sub-par conditions. A
bifurcated system of employment protections in which one group enjoys
more remedies than the other cannot be sustained for long; it brings to
mind Jefferson's warning "that the friendless alien has indeed been
selected as the safest subject of a first experiment; but the citizen will
soon follow.""
CONCLUSION
Although unauthorized immigration poses a significant challenge to
immigration and border control in the United States, our reaction to
undocumented immigrants, once integrated into our social fabric,
arguably presents a more complicated question. What do we owe those
who have surreptitiously crossed our borders and have accepted jobs
that are expressly off limits? Do we owe them anything?
The United States cannot make up its mind on this question. As I
have described at length, undocumented workers are almost universally
258. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2251 (2009); see also supra
Part II.B.
259. THOMAS JEFFERSON, 7 THE WRITNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 303 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1896).

.

872

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

covered by most employment statutes. Employers are required, by law,
to maintain legally accepted working conditions for all employees,
regardless of status. Undocumented workers are entitled to fair wages,
to a discrimination-free working environment, and to many other
employment protections. However, undocumented workers are barred
in many instances from enforcing those rights with certain remedies,
including back pay, on the theory that by being here illegally,
undocumented immigrants can have no expectation of earning future
wages in the United States. In that sense, a status-based conception of
membership is displacing the territorial conception of membership that
has traditionally dominated matters of alienage law.
The decline of territoriality is not unique to the employment
sphere. Geography has decreasing importance to the distribution of
membership outside of the employment sphere. Courts have been
willing to depart from strict territoriality to extend rights beyond U.S.
borders and deny rights within U.S. borders. Instead of relying on an
individual's location, courts outside of the employment sphere are
asking more fundamental questions about membership. They are
evaluating an individual's community ties, the surrounding
community's obligations to the individual, and the risk of altering the
character of the community by denying rights. In essence, courts are
turning directly to the rationales that underlie the territorial model and
finding that the territorial model does not always lead to results
consonant with its own rationales. In the divergence from strict
territoriality and the increased scrutiny of territoriality, I have identified
the seeds of a new, post-territorial model emerging outside the
employment sphere.
Within the employment sphere, however, the demise of
territoriality has not paralleled the trajectory of territoriality outside of
the employment sphere. In the employment sphere, territoriality is not
undergoing the same transformation apparent outside the employment
sphere. Instead, the status-based model is encroaching upon and
displacing territoriality. I have argued that this trajectory poses serious
concerns. Not only does the denial of remedies based on status conflict
with the purposes of immigration and employment law, but it represents
an unwarranted collision of the immigration and employment spheres.
As I have argued, these spheres are and should remain separate and
should distribute goods, including rights, without reference to an
individual's membership in the other sphere. Rather, under the postterritorial approach emerging outside of the employment sphere,
undocumented immigrants are members of the employment sphere and
entitled to the full enforcement of their rights.
My conclusions in this Article are not the end of the inquiry.
Rather, I have offered a new way of thinking about the undocumented
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worker in the United States-I have depicted the plight of the
undocumented worker in terms of membership and belonging. I have
also attempted to give a larger context to questions surrounding
undocumented workers, and more broadly, undocumented immigrants.
My hope is that analyzing the undocumented worker through the lens of
membership may help illuminate the difficult path that lies ahead as the
United States engages in immigration reform and makes difficult
decisions about who belongs and what belonging here means.

*

